RBC Capital Markets analyst Mike Abramsky expects Apple (AAPL) to sell five million tablets in the product’s first year at market. At a retail price of $600 and a 30 percent gross margin, that would generate about $2.8 billion in revenue and add 30 cents to earnings per share. This assumes the tablet is neither a hit (iPhone) nor a niche product (MacBook Air), but ends up somewhere in between, the scenario Abramsky believes most likely.

As Abramsky cautions, nailing the sweet spot on price is crucial to the device’s success. “Pricing is key….Significant demand exists at $500-799, narrowing at $1000 at which level subsidies may be needed (assuming a mobile data version) for mass acceptance, suggesting both retail and carrier marketing/distribution similar to iPhone.”

The analyst asserts that “An Apple tablet priced at $500-700 unsubsidized ($200-300 subsidized) strikes squarely at heart of the entry level laptop and Netbook markets. Although the tablet would not offer the breadth of features or raw performance of traditional laptops, it would deliver an optimal experience for buyers looking for user-friendly, media-centric computing at entry-level price points.”

As for the effect of the tablet on other Apple products, “The tablet may cannibalize some Mac and iPod Touch buyers (est. 2-5% in scenario analysis), but the lack of Mac OS X compatibility (and emulated Windows) reduces the appeal of the tablet as a Mac replacement for Apple’s traditional premium Mac buyers.”

PREVIOUSLY:

• Apple’s Tablet: MacBook Airbus?
• Apple Announces Jan. 27 Special Event: “Come See Our Latest Creation”
• Major Apple Product Announcement Set for Wednesday, Jan. 27
• Apple Pitching Tablet to Publishing Industry; Spring Launch Expected
• Time (Finally) for the Tablet? Apple Developers Supersizing Their Apps for January Event.
• The Apple Tablet Is Delayed? So What?
• $1.9 Billion in Capex? What’s Apple Planning?
• Apple’s Tablet: Read Different?
• Imaginary Demand for Mythical Apple Tablet Exceeds All Estimates
• Apple Tablet Coming to AT&T?
• New From Piper Jaffray Analyst Gene Munster: The Apple iPad
• Rumored Apple Netbook Actually an E-Book?
• iTablet: Apple’s Killer App for Higher Ed
• iFugly

Yesterday, BoomTown began grading the performance of Yahoo CEO Carol Bartz, after she gave herself a B- for overall performance for the year since she took over the troubled Internet giant.

But I decided to be more specific, splitting the grades into five categories: Management, financials, product innovation, deal-making and moxie.

For management, I gave Bartz an A-, because she has been a definite improvement on previous leadership in terms of decision-making, speed and essentially grabbing the mantle of control firmly from the start.

Some thought I was too generous and others thought the grade should have been an A+. Which means it was just about right!

Today, let’s look at financials–by which I mean Yahoo’s fiscal performance and its stock price.

In this regard, Bartz only gets a C++ (it’s a techie joke, get it?).

I could have given her a B- here, I guess, but–to me–C+ simply means financials have remained in a holding zone under Bartz, so she does not deserve to be completely decried, or applauded either.

Why? Well, let’s start with the stock.

While Yahoo (YHOO) shares are up about 38 percent for the year, which is a good thing, they still lag those of other Internet companies, as well as the market.

In the same period, the Nasdaq was up about 44 percent, Google’s stock has doubled and Microsoft (MSFT) shares are also up a lot more.

In an interview with Bloomberg recently, Bartz claimed that Yahoo was in the “penalty box” with investors–a hangover from former management, presumably–and this is the reason for its weaker stock gain.

Whatever. But Bartz has been the CEO for a year and Wall Street is still holding out. Thus, she has to fully take the blame instead of pointing at the previous administration.

In other words, former CEO and co-founder Jerry Yang and the Yangtanic are ancient history. So, all is forgiven, Jerry (call me!).

Bartz also blamed the recession for Yahoo’s continued revenue decline in 2009, about 12 percent overall in the most recent quarter.

She told Bloomberg, “We came out of one of the worst climates ever. And if you look at growth of Fortune 500 companies, only being down 12 or 15 percent is damn good. I’m not going to apologize for our growth.”

Again, whatever. But she runs a company in a high-growth industry and is not selling hams or socks, so perhaps bragging that being down 12 to 15 percent is “damn good” is a bit of a stretch.

(Microsoft certainly did not crow over its 14 percent decline in revenue in the most recent quarter even though it beat expectations, and its fiscal results rely a lot on something that does get profoundly affected–namely, sales of PCs–in a recession.)

Specifically, in the third quarter, Yahoo’s search advertising revenue was off 19 percent, and display was off eight percent at “Owned and Operated” sites on Yahoo.

Google, in contrast, reported a seven percent rise in its third-quarter results, and its execs projected a mood of smooth sailing ahead and no more econalypse. Financial performance at Amazon (AMZN) was also way up, as it was at Netflix (NFLX) and Apple (AAPL).

Still, Yahoo’s fiscal performance relies a lot on premium branded advertising, so it has remained weaker and will do so until the economy really comes back.

Many analysts are predicting exactly that, with double-digit sales growth in this area ahead.

And Yahoo’s bottom line is likely to get a boost when its costs are off-loaded to Microsoft, as part of the search and advertising partnership Bartz struck with the software giant earlier this year. The deal awaits regulatory approval, which is likely, and will then start to kick in later in the year.

Still, a dark cloud hangs ominously over the persistent search share declines Yahoo has suffered, which Bartz and others attribute to loss of toolbar and other distribution deals that Google (GOOG) and Microsoft picked up.

But query growth rates are also down and that’s a red flag, especially since Microsoft and Google are up a lot.

Nonetheless, depending on how these various parts of Yahoo revenue sort themselves out, along with Bartz’s cost-cutting, Yahoo’s bottom line is most likely to look better in the quarters ahead, so the stock could certainly go up quickly.

And so could her financial grade. Bartz is well known for being great at managing the bottom line and Wall Street expectations, so I suspect it is top of mind for her.

That said, once that registers, everyone will then be looking for not just a return to normal, but for actual growth.

And that can only come from product innovation–the name of the game in Silicon Valley–which is what will be on the grading block Monday.

So, 100,000 iPhones sold in 40 days. That’s better than some had feared. But it’s nowhere near what we’ve come to expect from the iPhone, which sold 270,000 units in the first 30 hours it was on sale in the U.S. in 2007. And it’s a pittance for China Unicom, whose subscribers number somewhere around 144 million.

Certainly, 100,000 iPhone users aren’t going to do much for the carrier’s bottom line. Still, China Unicom says it is happy with the device’s performance so far and insists it is on track to hit long-term sales targets: “iPhone will become China’s best-selling smartphone.”

Said China Unicom Chief Executive Chang Xiaobing: “iPhone has been a great success and we are very pleased with the response from Chinese consumers.”

That might sound like a bit of an exaggeration given the iPhone’s modest sales numbers in a country whose wireless market is the world’s largest. But consider this: There are some two million gray-market iPhones in use in China. And China Unicom’s network is the only one that’s compatible with their 3G functions. So it’s entirely possible that Unicom, while it might not be selling a lot of iPhones, is selling a lot of iPhone data plans to owners of gray market devices who want to run them on the carrier’s network.

That won’t help employees at Time Warner’s Time Inc. publishing unit: The company confirmed that it will make big cuts this quarter and spend up to $100 million on restructuring charges. This is different from the $100 million in cuts that had been previously reported, but it will still mean hundreds of layoffs at the publisher.

Time Warner also boosted its guidance for the remainder of the year and confirmed once again that it wants to spin off AOL before the end of the year. As well it should: The company said it has already spent a staggering $24 million on the spinoff so far this year, which includes $9 million in “pretax direct transaction costs (e.g., legal and professional fees).” It has spent another $83 million in restructuring charges at that unit in 2009.

As usual, Time Warner said ad sales have been lousy, but that its cable networks and film divisions had done okay. The breakdown:

• Cable networks: Revenue up five percent, because subscriber fees were up nine percent. Ad revenue was down one percent.
• Warner Bros. movie studio: Revenue down four percent, because of slumping DVD sales.
• Time Inc.: Revenue down 18 percent; advertising down 22 percent. Adjusted operating income down 42 percent. Hence the coming cuts.
• AOL: Revenue down 23 percent. Subscription revenue, which will continue to shrink, was down another 29 percent, and ad revenue, which is supposed to improve one day, was down 18 percent.

The short version is that unlike its broadcast peers, CBS (CBS) has been reluctant to make many of its shows available on the Web because it worries that doing so cuts into its core TV business.

So while GE’s (GE) NBC Universal and News Corp.’s (NWS) Fox put Hulu together, CBS stayed away. And when Disney (DIS) decided to join the joint venture earlier this year, CBS executives argued strenuously against the deal. Instead, CBS has been content to use the Web as a promotional tool for TV via outlets like Google’s (GOOG) YouTube.

The longer version is below, via the transcript of a brief chat I had with Smith this afternoon to discuss his plans and the network’s. This is stuff he’s talked about before–to reporters, in industry forums, and even via emails he wishes he hadn’t written–but I’m running it at length here.

Because 1) I think Smith does a good job of explaining the push-and-pull of Web viewership vs. Web economics that everyone in big media is grappling with, and 2) I want people to see just how difficult it is to keep up when Smith talks. He can get out a lot of words in a relatively short time.

I also had a quick chat with CBS CEO Les Moonves, who made many of the points Smith did, but with less verbiage: I’ll get you that transcript shortly, too.

Peter Kafka: Since you’re going to be advising CBS’s Web video strategy, why don’t you lay out, for the record, where things stand?

Quincy Smith:

We recognize that the Web is two things. It’s both a new medium…and there my example has always been, look at fantasy football: When you’re nice enough to watch the Jets just pound the snot out of the Raiders on Sunday, on a CBS channel…on fantasy football on CBSSports.com, you start on the Tuesday before and end the Wednesday after.

And what are you doing? You’re personalizing it, you’re becoming more of a fan of the game [Smith goes on to praise CBSSports.com's feature set]. All of those things are additive, so when Sunday comes in, you’re actually more of a fan, and you’ve even more convinced you’re going to watch that broadcast show.

Now, I realize that sports is reasonably bulletproof, and a good case study to begin with versus some of the other programming, but the fact is, the Web is a new medium. So what do I also mean? Tech reviews on CNET, Money Watch being watched on BNET. GameSpot videogame reviews.

Access to content that CBS didn’t already have, that are additive–both in their own right online, with the margins that the CNET business is used to, and where we’re getting just stronger and stronger from a margin perspective–and potential content that can also be applied to our [local TV stations owned by CBS], our affiliates, our broadcast news, as well as the radio. So that’s the side of our business that is $600 million revenue and $50 million-plus profit on the bottom line.

The other side of the Web, the side that is most thought of by many journalists, is the threat of an IP-deliverer of video. And how you turn that threat into an opportunity.

And so, from that perspective, as  you know, we didn’t go ahead and say, “Okay, we’re going to lock down and stream, with all of our other peers in broadcast, and come up with the same rules, and embed and right-click this and go away.” I’ve never had a beef with Hulu. Hulu’s always worked as a great service. That’s part of the problem.

As a network, we need to make sure that our content is being seen where the dollars matter. And right now that’s on air. Opportunities like TV Everywhere–we’re not putting all of our eggs in that basket, though we are big advocates of it–are ones where you can actually take and expand and extend the television market online, so it doesn’t matter what screen you watch “CSI” on; what matters is that you watched it, it counts and you saw the ads.

But until that happens, it’s crazy to just stream the shows for zero economics. When in fact you can make a lot more money doing things that are additive and complementary to the rest of the CBS line. That’s where CBS interactive comes in now.

Kafka: But TV viewers are showing an increasing interest in watching their programs on the Web, whether from legal services like the Web or illegal torrents and pirate sites. Don’t you need to reach them where they are?

Smith:

Now, if you really look at those numbers, what they’ll say is [online and offline video are] both growing, right? We’re having the best year ever as America’s largest broadcast network, and I think that 99.9 percent of that–this is the quote I’ve never been able to get in there–is that’s [because] of the great content that we have. There’s some infinitesimal basis point that’s relevant [to CBS ratings because] we are making sure that when people watch it, they’re more inclined to watch it on television. For now.

Once that solution moves, once those economics move–whether that’s more ads, [higher] CPMs, more ad buyers….You and I can say all day long, “We’re sold out on Web video. That’s going really well. It’s sold out.” Well, no kidding, it’s sold out. It’s a $700 million market. The television market is $120 billion. And of that, $700 million, half of those [ad buyers] are spending  90 percent of their time doing Google keywords, not buying online video.

The key is, how do you turn television buyers into video buyers? And that’s where a solution like TV Everywhere comes into play.

And by the way, looking at [Hulu CEO Jason] Kilar’s comments the other day, in Colorado [at an industry convention], he sees that too. He’s more sophisticated on this stuff than most anybody. From the perspective of, he understands that’s where the big dollars are. And so he probably went at it as, “I’m going to aggregate all the people first, so hopefully things like TV everywhere come to us.” From our perspective at CBS, we’ve got to go to them.

I don’t hate Hulu. Hulu’s world-class video viewing. What I don’t understand is, why license all that content to something that works that well, that seamlessly, yet–without the economic model around it?