He’d also been heavily recruited. Sources familiar with the situation told me that Swainson had been in line for a very senior and nearly identical job at Hewlett-Packard. Swainson didn’t return my call seeking comment, and spokesmen for HP and Dell declined to comment, as well.

Dell is launching the Software Group, it said in a statement, to build out its muscle on the software side as a complement to its overall mission of selling IT services.

And there’s probably no one better to do it than Swainson. Since 2009 he’s been an adviser at private equity firm Silver Lake Partners. But from 2004 to 2009 he ran CA with one single goal in mind: Rebuilding its reputation following an accounting scandal that ended when its prior CEO, Sanjay Kumar, was sentenced to 12 years in prison. The company paid $225 million to settle federal charges brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice.

But before CA, Swainson had spent 26 years at IBM. Among the things he did at Big Blue was spend seven years as general manager of its Application Integration Middleware division, which was a business he created. It was during those years that IBM launched its WebSphere family of products.

So that leaves just one question: Who’s going to run the HP software division that it had wanted Swainson to run?

Given the recent feuds between the management teams at the two companies, Oracle’s acquisitive history and HP’s sudden weakness, it doesn’t take much for a popular narrative of Oracle buying HP to emerge. It would be a dramatic denouement to the events of the last year that have found HP and Oracle at increasingly caustic loggerheads. Oracle CEO Larry Ellison would take some kind of victory lap and mount HP on the wall like a of trophy.

The idea gained some currency with an Aug. 21 story in the New York Post (which, like this Web site, is owned by News Corp.) arguing that HP’s $11.7 billion bid for the British software firm Autonomy, having caused shareholders to knock $12 billion and change off HP’s market cap, would therefore make HP more attractive to Oracle.

The meme gained further currency with a Bloomberg News story saying that HP’s board was “concerned” that its weakened condition had left it vulnerable to Oracle.

Let me put it like this: No. Just, no.

The first problem with the notion is this: What parts of HP would Oracle want to own? Answer: Practically none.

First, let’s look at the condition of Oracle: Its mainline software businesses are showing healthy returns, while its hardware business, built on the foundation of Sun Microsystems, the IT hardware concern it acquired last year for $7 billion, is ramping up to full speed. But here’s a fundamental truth: Software carries a higher profit margin than hardware, so when software companies buy hardware companies, they can’t avoid seeing their overall profitability erode.

Consider Oracle’s operating margin during its fiscal fourth quarter — its seasonally strongest quarter — during the last three years. In 2009, before the Sun deal was closed, it was 43.4 percent. In 2010, after the Sun deal was closed, it was 38.3 percent. In 2011 it was 41.6 percent. And during Oracle’s most recent conference call, CFO Safra Catz said Oracle hopes to get back to “pre-Sun” operating margins soon.

Now let’s look at HP and its operating margins: In its most recent quarter ended July, HP’s enterprise, storage and networking business turned in operating margins of 13 percent, which were down from 14 percent in the prior year’s period. The story was the same in practically every other HP business unit: Operating margins in services fell from 15.7 percent to 13 percent; in software they fell from 28 percent to 19.7 percent; imaging and printing margins fell to 14.6 percent from 16.9 percent. The only place they increased was the personal systems group — the PC unit that’s being considered for a spinoff — where they grew year on year from 4.7 percent to 5.9 percent.

Conclusion: Owning HP would do nothing good for Oracle’s profitability, especially at a moment when the stated goal is to nudge them up.

There’s more. As Mark L. Moerdler, an analyst at Bernstein Research, argued in a research note to clients on Sept. 26, software accounts for about 2 percent of revenue at HP. And what software it has is not the type that Oracle typically likes. When Oracle does acquisitions, it grabs companies that make applications that plug holes in its own product portfolio. The majority of HP’s software offerings — Autonomy nothwithstanding — deal with infrastructure management, not exactly a priority for Oracle. It is, however, a business where IBM and Computer Associates participate.

And there are two historically important business units at HP that would be outliers at Oracle: PCs and printers. Oracle has no interest in either one, and it’s hard to see that changing. Combined they make up more than half of HP’s annual revenue. In the hands of Oracle, they would probably end up being spun out, either together or separately, but why buy a whole company only to chop off more than half of it — a half that’s shrinking at that — at what would have to be unfavorable terms.

Let’s not forget the valuation estimate of HP’s $40 billion PC business: Analysts have expected that a hypothetical buyer might pay as little as $8 billion for it, or about one-fifth trailing revenue. Why go to all that trouble?

Further: Why would Oracle buy a company that’s roughly one-quarter exposed to the consumer market. Sure, HP has a retail distribution network that’s the envy of the PC industry. But Oracle would rather sell those retailers systems to help them manage their businesses, not the PCs they in turn resell at razor-thin margins.

If that’s not enough, then there’s one key bit about HP that Oracle would actively dislike. HP, by virtue of being the biggest distributor of Windows-based PCs and servers, is the world’s largest reseller of Microsoft Windows. If there’s anything more utterly antithetical to Oracle’s core values than helping put money in Microsoft’s pocket, I haven’t heard of it.

Finally, there’s the issue of cash. Even in its weakened state, HP is trading at a market cap of $45 billion and change. Assuming a premium for the whole thing, that pushes a hypothetical price tag to $60 billion. That’s too rich, even for Oracle, whose balance sheet as of Aug. 31 contained a combined $31.6 billion in cash and marketable securities. It would have to take on a tremendous amount of debt — amounting to 82 percent of fiscal 2011 sales — to get such a deal started, let alone closed.

HP’s directors and shareholders can rest easy. They have many worries about the Silicon Valley icon and the troubles in which it finds itself. But being acquired by Oracle isn’t one of them.

Infor, a closely held maker of software aimed at mid-size companies, on Monday said Phillips will take over as its CEO starting Dec. 1.

The appointment comes after a bid by Phillips to become CEO of publicly traded software maker CA fell through earlier this year, after billboards publicizing his relationship with a woman other than his wife appeared in New York City and other places, people familiar with the matter have said.

Jim Schaper, Infor’s outgoing CEO, who will continue to serve as chairman, said Phillips is “a perfect fit” for Infor, which is based outside Atlanta and serves 70,000 customers globally, most of which are mid-size companies.

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“As difficult as they are, these actions are necessary to focus our skills and investments on those activities that support our corporate strategy and have the greatest impact on our performance, growth and customer loyalty,” McCracken said in an all-hands memo.

“The industry and the market are changing, and we have to change, tooI…,” the CEO added. “It’s not enough to accelerate our growth. Our objective is profitable growth. You can never cut your way to growth. And I recognize that the actions we’re taking are difficult. But in the end, they will make CA stronger and more competitive.”

Goldman Sachs published its “Americas: 2009 Software Outlook” report today and it’s as dismal and ugly a forecast as you’d expect, given the current economic climate.

“The worst of the IT-spending slowdown likely remains in front of us, as we start the clock on slashed 2009 budgets,” Goldman said in the report. “We forecast 0 percent revenue growth for our group, below consensus at 5 percent, and 1 percent earnings growth, below Street at 2 percent.”

Beyond that, the firm forsees an eight percent decline in developed economy tech capital investment, with the likes of Microsoft (MSFT), Oracle (ORCL), SAP (SAP), Symantec (SYMC), CA (CA)–the so called Big 5–treading water until the economy recovers. Said Goldman, “We expect the Big 5 software companies…to benefit from more defensive revenue streams due to critical nature of functions, ‘stickier’ maintenance, stronger negotiating leverage, and a likely spending consolidation to larger vendors. Hence, we assume 0 percent growth for this group in 2009.”

Ugly. Could have been worse, though.

Kumar alleges they were all aware of the infamous “35-day month” ploy for which he and eight other former CA (CA) officials took the fall. “Wang was not only aware of the accounting improprieties, such as the 35-Day Month, he also actively participated in concealing those improper accounting practices. … Wang knew that CA’s quarters were ‘open’ for five days into the next month per his directive, and he sometimes instructed CA to keep CA’s books ‘open’ after the usual ‘five days’ to execute license agreements and recognize revenue from those agreements in the previously ended quarters.”

Damning allegations and ones Wang, D’Amato, et al., vigorously deny.
Said a spokesman for Ranieri and D’Amato: “[Kumar] from jail continues to be a stranger to the truth.”