In a 4-1 vote–Commissioner Michael Copps dissented–the FCC is allowing the deal to go through, but with some conditions, most of them relating to the online video business. One key requirement that’s not happening: Comcast isn’t being required to divest itself of its equity in the Web video site Hulu, which a few lawmakers had called for. It will however be required to give up its role in managing Hulu. NBC U jointly owns it with the Walt Disney Co. and News Corp. (which also owns this Web site).

In a statement, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski said the conditions imposed “include carefully considered steps to ensure that competition drives innovation in the emerging online video marketplace.”

Among those conditions, the FCC will also require Comcast to offer Web versions of its TV shows to what it calls “bona fide online distributors” under the same terms it offers them to cable and satellite providers. This would indicate that shows appearing on Hulu will probably end up on Apple TV or YouTube or elsewhere, meaning, as MediaMemo’s Peter Kafka suggested last month that Hulu’s exclusive rights to NBC content are over.

Comcast will also be required to offer broadband to some 2.5 million low-income households for less than $10 a month, and will be required to extend its network to reach 400,000 homes, build out service in six rural communities and provide free video and high-speed Internet access to 600 schools and libraries in underserved areas. This will allow Genachowski to claim some kind of victory on one of the Obama administration’s signature technology policy issues, which is spreading the availability of broadband.

In a dissenting statement, Copps called the merger “a transaction like no other that has come before this commission–ever,” and said “It confers too much power in one company’s hands.”

Harold Feld, legal director at Public Knowledge, a Washington, D.C.-based public interested group, said the organization was largely satisfied with the conditions except for one. It would have liked to see Comcast required to sell broadband service on a wholesale basis. “As longtime supporters of wholesale access, we believe such a condition would go a long way to help consumers by increasing broadband competition,” he said.

However, the European Court of Justice’s advocate general, Niilo Jaaskinen, in giving his opinion, said eBay could continue to purchase advertising keywords, including L’Oréal trademarks, in order to direct users of Internet search engines to its site.

The ECJ said L’Oréal can prohibit the sale of “testers and dramming bottles, often marked with the words ‘not for sale’… supplied without charge to the trade mark proprietor’s authorized distributors,” because they “cannot be considered as being goods put on the market with the consent of the trade mark proprietor.”

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The short version: Rep. Rick Boucher, the Virginia Democrat who heads the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet, asked NBC head Jeff Zucker about last year’s incident involving Hulu’s effort to bar Boxee from using its feed.

At the time, Hulu CEO Jason Kilar said his actions were prompted by his “content owners,” which most people, including me, assumed meant GE’s (GE) NBC and/or News Corp.’s (NWS) Fox, the media conglomerates that had invested in the video service.

But today at the hearings, Zucker pointed the finger back at Hulu (full clip at bottom of this post):

This was a decision made by the Hulu management to, uh, what Boxee was doing was illegally taking the content that was on Hulu without any business deal. And, you know, all, all the, we have several distributors, actually many distributors of the Hulu content that we have legal distribution deals with so we don’t preclude distribution deals. What we preclude are those who illegally take that content.

In a blog post, Boxee CEO Avner Ronen points out the seeming inconsistency between the two statements–though he’s incorrect in saying that Kilar blamed NBC, because Kilar didn’t actually say that in his original blog post. That makes sense, because Kilar is one careful and cautious dude, which you have to be when you’re running a joint venture that’s now co-owned by three big media conglomerates.

Ronen also restates his general case–that Boxee is not much more than a Web browser, so it’s not taking anyone’s content at all, just displaying it, ads and all. And from what I can tell, that argument is gaining increasing traction among some big media players.

But while I’ve never been able to get a straight answer from Hulu or its owners about the Boxee incident, I do get the sense that it’s one issue that sticks in the collective craw of Hulu managers. So I’m not sure things are going to get resolved anytime soon at that site.

I’ve asked Hulu and NBC for comment and will update if I hear back.

Under terms of the agreement, Intel (INTC) will pay AMD (AMD) $1.25 billion (nearly a quarter of AMD’s $4.46 billion market cap) and agree to “abide by a set of business practice provisions” presumably crafted to temper Intel’s allegedly anticompetitive practices. Here are details of the agreement:

Business Practices Provisions Prohibit Intel From:

• Offering inducements to customers in exchange for their agreement to buy all of their microprocessor needs from Intel, whether on a geographic, market segment, or any other basis (Section 2.1.1.a)
• Offering inducements to customers in exchange for their agreement to limit or delay their purchase of microprocessors from AMD, whether on a geographic, market segment, or any other basis (Section 2.1.1.b)
• Offering inducements to customers in exchange for their agreement to limit their engagement with AMD or their promotion or distribution of products containing AMD microprocessors, whether on a geographic, channel, market segment, or any other basis (Section 2.1.2a-b)
• Offering inducements to customers in exchange for their agreement to abstain from or delay their participation in AMD product launches, announcements, advertising, or other promotional activities (Section 2.1.2.b)
• Offering inducements to customers or others to delay or forebear in the development or release of computer systems or platforms containing AMD microprocessors, whether on a geographic, market segment, or any other basis (Section 2.2.2 and 2.1.2)
• Offering inducements to retailers or distributors to limit or delay their purchase or distribution of computer systems or platforms containing AMD microprocessors, whether on a geographic, market segment, or any other basis (Section 2.2.1)
• Withholding any benefit or threatening retaliation against anyone for their refusal to enter into a prohibited arrangement such as the ones listed above.

In return, AMD will drop all its pending litigation against the company and pull out of regulatory complaints worldwide. Finally, the two rivals will enter into a five-year patent cross-licensing agreement.

In a joint statement, the companies said, “While the relationship between the two companies has been difficult in the past, this agreement ends the legal disputes and enables the companies to focus all of our efforts on product innovation and development.”

Interesting. Clearly, AMD CEO Dirk Meyer’s earlier comments about the ratification of its complaints about Intel’s business practices and the company’s hope for a future in which AMD’s “ability to succeed as a business is really determined by the quality of our products and customer relationships” was quite prefigurative.

During a call to discuss the settlement, Meyer said the accord marks the beginning of a new era, one that changes the game for AMD. “It is an important milestone for us, for our customers, our partners, and most importantly–for consumers and businesses worldwide,” Meyer said.

“It is the culmination years of litigation and regulatory engagement, and we are optimistic that it will usher a new era for our industry,” the CEO continued, further noting that change may not be immediate. “We recognize that it will take time for people to understand how the operating conditions in processor business have changed–but make no mistake–they have changed….We look forward to healthy competition with the mutual respect one would expect between world-class competitors.”

It is unclear if the settlement will affect the antitrust suit brought against Intel by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo last week as Cuomo hasn’t yet commented. But the European Union says it will not change its decision in May to fine Intel a record $1.5 billion for anticompetitive behavior.

“The European Commission takes note that Intel and AMD have settled all their litigation and that Intel is paying AMD compensation of one-and-quarter billion dollars,” said an EC spokesman. “But Intel has an ongoing obligation to comply with the commission’s antitrust decision and with EU competition law. The commission continues to vigorously monitor Intel’s compliance with its obligations under the EU antitrust decision.”

You see, Palm (PALM) defines units sold as products sold to on-the-street customers or to resellers like Best Buy (BBY) and Amazon.com (AMZN). Which means that Palm can report a unit sold while it’s still sitting at inventory at various retail outlets. In other words, a Pre sold is not necessarily a Pre activated. As Eller notes, that’s problematic.

“We have been perplexed by a disconnect between PALM’s device units sold and our estimates of store level sell through,” Eller writes. “According to PALM’s reported sell through, inventory increased by 13k units and since the ‘vast majority’ of both the device units shipped and the device units sold were units of the Pre, there couldn’t be an inventory problem. The gap between the two is only 13k.”

Continuing, Eller adds a cautionary note: “However, since the company recognizes revenue on sell in to the channel and the company defines device units sold as units that have been shipped from Sprint (their primary customer) to either customers or second tier distributors, PALM could offer investors a high number of units shipped but still have a glut of inventory in the channel. We believe that channel inventory is currently about 11 weeks, which we believe will pressure reorder rates and make it more difficult to sell high ASP products going forward.”

An 11-week glut of inventory in the channel? If that’s the case, it’s certainly cause for concern, more so because many investors are evidently unaware that this is even a possibility. “[Palm’s definition of sold] does not appear to be understood by investors,” Eller notes. “We polled several of the investors who attended the Boston road show lunch and each was under the impression that sell through translated into customer activations. How can this be?”

Good question. Palm and Sprint (S) investors both might want to pay a bit more attention to Sprint’s 10-k in the future.

I’ve asked Palm for comment and will update this post when it responds.

UPDATE: This just in from Palm:

“The sell-through data we post reflects carriers’ sales to their customers. For example, Sprint customers include consumers who buy in a Sprint store, and Sprint retail partners such as Best Buy and RadioShack. We rely on our wireless carriers to provide us with sell-through data, and we note this fact in our 10Q.”

[Image credit: Flickr/Spintar]

You see, Palm (PALM) defines units sold as products sold to on-the-street customers or to resellers like Best Buy (BBY) and Amazon.com (AMZN). Which means that Palm can report a unit sold while it’s still sitting at inventory at various retail outlets. In other words, a Pre sold is not necessarily a Pre activated. As Eller notes, that’s problematic.

“We have been perplexed by a disconnect between PALM’s device units sold and our estimates of store level sell through,” Eller writes. “According to PALM’s reported sell through, inventory increased by 13k units and since the ‘vast majority’ of both the device units shipped and the device units sold were units of the Pre, there couldn’t be an inventory problem. The gap between the two is only 13k.”

Continuing, Eller adds a cautionary note: “However, since the company recognizes revenue on sell in to the channel and the company defines device units sold as units that have been shipped from Sprint (their primary customer) to either customers or second tier distributors, PALM could offer investors a high number of units shipped but still have a glut of inventory in the channel. We believe that channel inventory is currently about 11 weeks, which we believe will pressure reorder rates and make it more difficult to sell high ASP products going forward.”

An 11-week glut of inventory in the channel? If that’s the case, it’s certainly cause for concern, more so because many investors are evidently unaware that this is even a possibility. “[Palm’s definition of sold] does not appear to be understood by investors,” Eller notes. “We polled several of the investors who attended the Boston road show lunch and each was under the impression that sell through translated into customer activations. How can this be?”

Good question. Palm and Sprint (S) investors both might want to pay a bit more attention to Sprint’s 10-k in the future.

I’ve asked Palm for comment and will update this post when it responds.

UPDATE: This just in from Palm:

“The sell-through data we post reflects carriers’ sales to their customers. For example, Sprint customers include consumers who buy in a Sprint store, and Sprint retail partners such as Best Buy and RadioShack. We rely on our wireless carriers to provide us with sell-through data, and we note this fact in our 10Q.”

[Image credit: Flickr/Spintar]

What happened? The details are fuzzy, but apparently, a publisher that supplied Amazon (AMZN) with two George Orwell titles has decided that it doesn’t want to sell them via Amazon anymore. So away they went.

Readers described their experiences at this Amazon forum, and one of them included this note she said she received from Amazon customer service explaining what happened:

The Kindle edition books Animal Farm by George Orwell. Published by MobileReference (mobi) & Nineteen Eighty-Four (1984) by George Orwell. Published by MobileReference (mobi) were removed from the Kindle store and are no longer available for purchase. When this occured, your purchases were automatically refunded. You can still locate the books in the Kindle store, but each has a status of not yet available. Although a rarity, publishers can decide to pull their content from the Kindle store.

Normally, I’m pretty cavalier about the complaints that people make about the evils of digital rights management–the locks and restrictions distributors often attach to digital media like music, movies and books–but this is the sort of incident that gives those gripes some gravitas. If you’re buying bits, you ought to own those bits, just as you would when you plunk down dollars for a CD, a book or any other physical item.

Doubly confusing: As far as I can tell, Amazon’s license terms don’t have any loophole that allows for this. The section on “digital content” explains that I don’t have the right to “sell, rent, lease, distribute,” etc., the stuff I buy from Amazon. But it sure looks like stuff I buy, I keep:

Upon your payment of the applicable fees set by Amazon, Amazon grants you the non-exclusive right to keep a permanent copy of the applicable Digital Content and to view, use, and display such Digital Content an unlimited number of times, solely on the Device or as authorized by Amazon as part of the Service and solely for your personal, non-commercial use. Digital Content will be deemed licensed to you by Amazon under this Agreement unless otherwise expressly provided by Amazon.

So, what am I missing here? I’ve asked Amazon for comment, but if anyone has any bright ideas, sound off in comments below.

UPDATE: Amazon says the copies it sold were “illegal”, because the publisher never had the rights to them. But it says that going forward, it won’t be removing books from customer’s Kindles “in these circumstances”.

Graph one: Look how fast this business is growing! Broadcast and cable shows on the Web will generate less than $600 million in ad dollars in the U.S. this year, but four years from now that number will be close to $1.5 billion (click to enlarge).

Graph two: Look how tiny this business is! That $1.5 billion will be a drop in the bucket for TV advertising as a whole, which is a $70 billion business, give or take a billion. (It’s so small it’s literally almost impossible to find, but if you squint hard you can see a tiny sliver of dark green on the top part of the chart below.) And crucially, it will be smaller than the $2 billion that Amel predicts will flow out of conventional TV advertising.

Amel is the same analyst who cause a bit of a stir last year when he predicted that Hulu, the joint venture owned by News Corp.’s (NWS) Fox, GE’s (GE) NBC and Disney’s (DIS) ABC, was on track to eclipse Google’s (GOOG) YouTube in gross profit. This report is less pointed–it’s basically a landscape piece–but there are still some good nuggets.

Such as:

• Apple’s (AAPL) iTunes dominates the market for paid TV shows delivered over the Web and controlled 60 percent of the market last year. Amel figures iTunes will hold on to 43 percent of the market by 2013. But he thinks that market will be significantly smaller than advertising on free TV shows delivered over the Web: $800 million vs. $1.5 billion in four years.
• Web TV purveyors like Hulu and CBS (CBS) have been reluctant to run as many ads online as they do on conventional TV. But Amel says that will change. Web TV shows carry an average of five ads per hour, but he figures distributors can eventually boost that number to 12 ads an hour.

One big caveat here: Amel’s report only addresses TV shows on the Web, not video on the Web. Amel doesn’t spell this out, but I assume that’s because he’s most concerned here with the fate of existing players like NBC, ABC, et al. And, I’m guessing, because he doesn’t think that video on the Web that isn’t TV has much value.

There’s a whole ecosystem of players creating and distributing Web-native video who would argue with that. But they’ll have a stronger case when they can show significant revenue of their own.