The presentation catalyzed a movement. Start-ups everywhere adopted a lean, low-burn, low-investment model. To this day, companies seeking funding at our venture firm, Andreessen Horowitz, proudly proclaim in their pitch decks that they are raising tiny amounts of capital so they can run lean.

On the one hand, it is a fact that capital invested is negatively correlated with returns in the venture capital industry. Pumping too much money into a small start-up is unhealthy for both the company and the investor. On the other hand, Facebook has raised several hundred million dollars and is on track to produce fantastic returns for all of its investors.

So what’s a start-up to do? Much of what has been written and said about lean start-ups makes good sense. However, that advice is often incomplete, and some of the things left unsaid are the least intuitive. In this article, I will articulate some of those things left unsaid in arguing the case for the Fat Start-up.

Here is my central argument. There are only two priorities for a start-up:
Winning the market and not running out of cash. Running lean is not an end. For that matter, neither is running fat. Both are tactics that you use to win the market and not run out of cash before you do so. By making “running lean” an end, you may lose your opportunity to win the market, either because you fail to fund the R&D necessary to find product/market fit or you let a competitor out-execute you in taking the market. Sometimes running fat is the right thing to do.

What the hell do I know?

“Al Pacino couldn’t be no gangsta, DeNiro in ‘Casino’ he no gangsta
Wanna be, wanna see, wan’ get a shovel
dig Tookie up n*&%^!, cause he know gangstas”

–The Game

At this point, some of you are asking yourselves, “What the hell does Ben know? If he were really smart, then he’d know that thin is in.” It turns out that I have some experience in managing a fat start-up through the dot-com implosion of the early 2000s. This chart offers a brief summary of equity market history when I was CEO of Loudcloud and Opsware (click to enlarge):

Note that the Nasdaq index is very highly correlated to the start-up funding environment. During the two years I was CEO of Opsware, the Nasdaq fell 80 percent, far more than it has fallen during the current 2008-10 downturn. So the 2000-02 environment was at least as traumatic as this one for Silicon Valley companies–and arguably much worse.

Here is a brief summary of Loudcloud/Opsware’s fund-raising history during that time:

• September 1999: Loudcloud founded
• November 1999: Loudcloud raises $21 million at a $45 million pre-money valuation (Benchmark Capital is the lead investor)
• January 2000: Loudcloud borrows $45 million from Morgan Stanley (MS)
• June 2000: Loudcloud raises $120M at a $700M pre-money valuation
• March 2001: Loudcloud goes public on Nasdaq, raises $160 million and is valued in the public markets at approximately $480 million. Total funds raised to this point: $346 million.
• August 2002: Loudcloud sells the managed services business to EDS (this was the only actual business we had at the time) for $63.5 million and becomes a software company (and changes its name to Opsware).
• September 2002: Opsware trades for 35 cents per share or approximately a $28 million market cap.
• September 2007: Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) acquires Opsware for $1.6 billion

During this period, Loudcloud/Opsware had over 20 direct competitors. Almost all the competitors from the Loudcloud era went bankrupt, including MFN/SiteSmith, Exodus, LogicTier, Williams Communication, Global Crossing, WorldCom/Digex and Storage Networks. Those that survived got bought with valuations of less than $100 million (e.g., Totality) or still have very low valuations (e.g., Navisite).

How did we do it?

“I had a dream I could buy my way to heaven
When I awoke, I spent that on a necklace”

–Kanye West

So how did we navigate through the great dot-com crash, crush the competition, emerge as the No. 1 company in our space and sell the company to HP for $1.6 billion? Did we “cut spending, cut now, and preserve capital?” Did we make cash preservation our No. 1 priority?

No, we didn’t. To underscore the point, here are Loudcloud’s average monthly cash burn figures for the quarters ending in:

• Apr 2001:  $39 million
• Jul 2001:  $35 million
• Oct 2001:  $29 million
• Jan 2002:  $25 million
• Apr 2002:  $22 million
• Jul 2002:  $19.4 million

As you can see, we were aggressively investing in the business throughout 2001 and 2002. While we did reduce our cash burn, we did not make cash preservation our No. 1 priority. As it was, over the course of the transition from Loudcloud to EDS, we sadly laid off 400 employees and transferred another 150 to EDS. However, we didn’t scrimp and save our way to a $1.6 billion acquisition: Instead, it’s what we chose not to cut that ultimately got us there.

Loudcloud was a Web-hosting business. Today, we’d call it a “cloud services” business, but people weren’t quite ready for the “cloud” in 2001. We supercharged our hosting business with software (called Opsware) that automated our Web-hosting operations. The other cloud services businesses of our day also had software investments. However, as the macroeconomic climate changed, they all “cut deep and cut now.” In the end, they ended up putting their software in maintenance mode and stopped building new features.

As we weighed a decision to make the same deep cuts in our own software R&D efforts (a move advocated by the intelligentsia of the day, as well as nearly every MBA we had working in the company), I faced a hard decision: Cut deep and get to cash flow break-even quickly or continue to invest heavily in software?

In the end, I decided to run fat so that we could continue to invest in the Opsware software. At the end of the day, I realized that much larger companies like IBM (IBM) could hire smart people and train them. But without a lasting technology-based advantage, it would be increasingly hard for us to defeat them and build our customer base despite early wins with Ford (F), Fox Sports, and the U.K. government (to name just three of our early customers).

Running fat meant that I laid off zero software engineers so that we could keep on investing in our technology, find our product/market fit, and build a lasting technological advantage.

Still, we had to reduce costs or we would clearly go bankrupt. With this new view of the world, I decided that rather than divesting our intellectual property, I would divest our business. Now, that may sound logical the way I’ve described it, but consider these facts:

• We were generating $65 million/year from the Web-hosting business.
• We were a publicly traded company with a market capitalization of close to $200 million.
• All of our investors (pubic and private) believed in and invested in the Web-hosting business.
• We had close to 500 employees at the time. Nearly all of them were supporting the Web-hosting business.
• We had no other business. We had software, but we did not have a software product and certainly did not have a software business.

Despite all of this, we sold the Loudcloud hosting business to EDS and became Opsware the software company. It was not clear that this was a good idea at the time. In fact, the market thought it was a terrible idea: Our stock promptly lost 80 percent of its value, putting our market cap at about $28 million. It’s worth pointing out that this was about $40 million less than the cash that we had in the bank.

During the transition, we shrank our payroll from 450 employees to fewer than 100. Even with this massive reduction in expenses, it would take another three quarters to reach cash-flow break-even, a milestone we finally reached in Q2 of 2003.

One could argue–and many did–that we should have cut a lot deeper than we did given that we only had one customer. Although EDS was a very large customer (it generated $20 million/year in revenue), a brand new software company doesn’t need 100 people. We could have taken steps to reach cash-flow break-even immediately (clearly, that might have helped us get above 35 cents per share). In other words, we could have “gone lean” by cutting deep, cutting now, and preserving capital.

But rather than do what seemed obvious, I decided to keep on investing. Here’s why: In an economic boom, cash is great, but not necessarily a meaningful competitive advantage. If every company is well funded, being super-well funded doesn’t help you win. In fact, being super-well funded can actually screw you.

But in a bust (like the one we were in), having a lot of cash can be a huge competitive advantage because you can use that cash to put enormous pressure on your underfunded competitors. And that’s what we did.

We spent aggressively to match our best competitor’s product, feature for feature. And we used our public currency to acquire important adjacent functionality (network, process and storage management) that our competitors did not have and couldn’t acquire because they didn’t have the cash (or the equity).

In doing so, we were able to beat a really high-quality start-up (Bladelogic) that did not have the massive technical and cultural baggage that came from exiting the managed services business. Bladelogic was eventually sold to BMC (BMC) for $800 million. But I’m firmly convinced that had we not spent the money, Bladelogic would have emerged as the No. 1 company in the space and gotten the $1.6 billion exit instead of Opsware.

In the end, by continuing to invest aggressively in our technological advantage despite a hellacious funding environment, we were able to turn a doomed business into a winning one.

That is the very short version of how we won the market during the great tech recession of the early 2000s.

So did we learn?

“Hegel was right when he said that we learn from history that man can never learn anything from history.”

–George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)

Every start-up is in a furious race against time. The start-up must find the product-market fit that leads to a great business and substantially take the market before running out of cash. As a result, the top two priorities are always to:

1. Find the product that 1,000 enterprise or 50 million consumers want to buy and grab those customers before your competitors do.
2. Raise enough cash and spend it intelligently so that you don’t go broke along the way.

Clearly, you can’t succeed if you don’t achieve both priority No. 1 and priority No. 2. So why is taking the market more important than not running out of cash? Because the only thing worse for an entrepreneur than start-up hell (bankruptcy) is start-up purgatory.

What is start-up purgatory, you ask? Start-up purgatory occurs when you don’t go bankrupt, but you fail to build the No. 1 product in the space. You have enough money with your conservative burn rate to last for many years. You may even be cash-flow positive. However, you have zero chance of becoming a high-growth company. You have zero chance of being anything but a very small technology business (see Navisite). From the entrepreneur’s point of view, this can be worse than start-up hell since you are stuck with the small company.

You recruited all the employees, you raised all the money and you made all the promises. You either see it through or leave–without your good reputation. No one wants to work for an entrepreneur who quits his or her own company. This is start-up purgatory, where you work just as hard, reap none of the rewards, and watch all your best people leave you. It sucks to be you.

The Bottom Line

Spending a little or spending a lot is a means, not an end. Choose the right strategy to win the market or you may end up going straight to purgatory.

As you listen to the virtues of the lean start-up–lightweight sales, light engineering, and so on–keep the following in mind:

• If you are a high-tech start-up, your value is in your intellectual property. Don’t stare at your spreadsheets so long that you get confused about that.
• You cannot save your way to winning the market.
• The best companies can raise money even in this market. If you are one of those, you should consider raising enough to wipe out your competition.

Thin is in, but sometimes you gotta eat.

Ben Horowitz is co-founder and general partner of Andreessen Horowitz. He co-founded Loudcloud, later renamed Opsware Inc., in 1999 and served as CEO of the company before it was acquired in 2007 by Hewlett-Packard. He was most recently vice president and general manager of Hewlett-Packard’s Business Technology Organization Unit.

“We have almost $25 billion safely in the bank and zero debt. This provides us tremendous stability and the ability to invest our way through this downturn. This is what we did during the last downturn–we increased R&D investments and created some of our best new products and businesses, like the Apple retail stores, for one. This downturn may also present some extraordinary opportunities for companies that have the cash to take advantage of them, like Apple does.”

— Apple CEO Steve Jobs, Oct. 21, 2008

Apple made its first acquisition on March 2, 1988, with the purchase of Network Innovations. Since then, Apple has bought just 23 more companies (see table; click to enlarge), including Quattro Wireless, which it purchased for $275 million. Which isn’t all that many for a company with $23 billion in the bank (as a point of comparison, Google has acquired 11 companies in the last 18 months alone).

But that may soon change, because Cupertino finally has a dedicated acquisitions specialist, Adrian Perica. According to BusinessWeek, the former Goldman Sachs (GS) banker, who was brought in after Apple reportedly lost AdMob to Google (GOOG), is believed to have quarterbacked the company’s purchase of music site Lala in December and Quattro Wireless earlier this month.

Both were executed uncharacteristically quickly for Apple, which suggests that the company’s lackadaisical, ad hoc approach to M&A has been recast to make it, necessarily, more nimble. Said one Silicon Valley banker: “[Apple has] always gone slow on M&A, but that’s changing.”

Perhaps it’s a good time for that long-rumored merger with Adobe (ADBE). Then again, it’s probably never a good time for something like that.

This, according to research firm Forrester, which claims technology spending will roar back to life in 2010, ending the econalypse once and for all.

“While the Q3 2009 data for the U.S. and the global market showed continued declines in tech purchases (as we expected),” the company said in its report, U.S. and Global IT Market Outlook: Q4 2009, “we predict that the Q4 2009 data will show a small increase in buying activity, or at worst, just a small decline.”

Forrester (FORR) expects U.S. IT spending to grow by 6.6 percent in 2010 after falling 8.2 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, global IT spending, which plummeted 8.9 percent last year, will rise 8.1 percent in 2010 to more than $1.6 trillion.

Driving the recovery: Software, hardware and communications equipment. According to Forrester, worldwide spending on software is set to grow by 9.7 percent in the months ahead, spending on hardware and other computer equipment by 8.2 percent and spending on comm gear by 7.6 percent.

Said Forrester principal analyst Andrew Bartels: “All the pieces are in place for a 2010 tech spending rebound. In the U.S., the tech recovery will be much stronger than the overall economic recovery, with technology spending growing at more than twice the rate of gross domestic product this year.”

But this assumes there will be no further financial disaster in 2010. If this is not the case, then we have something else to look forward to.

“The most likely alternative to our forecast that the U.S. and global IT markets will recover in 2010 is a faltering tech market due to a double-dip recession that returns in 2010 after a brief two- to three-quarter economic recovery,” Forrester explains. “Should this happen, U.S. tech purchases would decline by 3% to 4% in 2010, with a second-half decline offsetting a first-half tech revival.”

PREVIOUSLY:

• Econalypto: A Rightsizing Roundup
• Google: Whoops! Econalypse
• Econalypse Now
• Analyst: The Great Dark Times Cometh!
• Wall Street: Give Me Something to Stop the Bleeding
• GOOG at $398? Clearly, You’re Dyslexic.
• WaMu: Epic Bail
• Ballmer: Better Safe Than Lehman Bros.
• Lehman Brothers: $2.5 Billion for a Bankruptcy Well Done
• Here’s $39 Billion in Recognition for Your Hard Work on the Forthcoming Financial Crisis
• Weekend at Bernanke’s II
• Weekend at Bernankes

According to a 10-Q filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sun (JAVA) lost $120 million, or 16 cents a share, on revenue of $2.24 billion in its first quarter. During the same period a year ago, Sun lost $1.68 billion, or $2.24 a share, on $2.99 billion in sales. Analysts had been expecting earnings of 25 cents a share on revenue of $2.31 billion.

Oracle (ORCL) CEO Larry Ellison recently said that Sun is losing about $100 million a month as it waits for European antitrust regulators to approve its acquisition by Oracle. Looks like he’s about right.

Below, excerpts from the 10-Q:

Server Products Revenue
The decrease in Server Products revenue during the first quarter of fiscal 2010, as compared to the corresponding period in fiscal 2009, was primarily due to the economic downturn and consolidation of our customer base, specifically in the financial services sector, as projects were scaled back, delayed or canceled, in addition to the uncertainty associated with the proposed acquisition by Oracle and increased competition.

Storage Products Revenue
The decrease in Storage Products revenue during the first quarter of fiscal 2010, as compared to the corresponding period in fiscal 2009, was primarily attributable to the economic downturn as projects were scaled back, delayed or canceled, in addition to the uncertainty associated with our proposed acquisition by Oracle and increased competition.

North America
The decrease in revenue during the first quarter of fiscal 2010, as compared to the corresponding period in fiscal 2009, was primarily due to decreased sales of our enterprise Server Products, storage disk products and Services. We are still seeing the results of IT budget cuts instituted last year by our largest customers due to the economic downturn, especially in the financial services sector, in addition to the consolidation of our customer base. Across all sectors, non-critical projects are on hold. Revenue was also negatively impacted by the uncertainty associated with our proposed acquisition by Oracle and increased competition.

PREVIOUSLY:

• European Union Mulling Objection to Oracle-Sun Deal
• Q: What’s the Difference Between Neelie Kroes and Larry Ellison?
• Sun to Sack 3,000
• Former MySQL Boss to EC: Approve Oracle-Sun Deal
• Ellison: Oracle Is the New IBM
• Mr. Ellison Asks That His Burgers Be Served With Freedom Fries Until Further Notice

Earlier today, Kara Swisher reported in BoomTown that RealNetworks (RNWK) would sack four percent of its workforce–70 employees out of its 1,700-person staff.

Below, the official internal memo from RealNetworks Founder, Chairman and CEO Rob Glaser, breaking the bad news:

Team–

I’m writing to share some important and unpleasant news with all of you. Today we are implementing a reduction in force primarily within our TPS and MSS divisions, as well as in a few of our shared services groups. Approximately 70 employees around the globe are impacted, which represents about 4% of our total workforce. Of these 70 employees, 51% are located within the US and 49% came from our international locations.

These staff reductions are a result of some trends and strategic decisions in our TPS and MSS businesses. I’d bucket the reductions into three categories–efficiency gains associated with eliminating or streamlining duplication of effort, businesses that have been impacted by the recession and/or cyclical downturns where we need to lower our costs and get more efficient, and slower growth businesses in which we have decided to reduce our investments so we can instead invest in areas with better growth prospects.

As a result of these changes being made today, the TPS and MSS divisions are now better positioned to continue to weather the economic storm in the short-term and to thrive and grow in the long-term. On behalf of everyone on the senior management team I would like to extend my thanks and appreciation to everyone being affected by today’s actions for their contributions to our company. We are offering all impacted employees generous severance packages and we are working closely with the affected teams to ensure a smooth and professional transition. Additionally, we are encouraging impacted employees to look for other roles within the company, and HR will assist them in this process.

Thank for your support and understanding.

Rob

“Notwithstanding the slow recovery of demand from the enterprise sector, we are encouraged that industry momentum has turned positive following the steepest downturn in more than a decade,” said SIA President George Scalise.

Great news were it not for the fact that at $19.1 billion, August sales were down a horrific 16.1 percent year-over-year. Furthermore, for the first eight months of 2009, sales are at $133.8 billion–about 21.3 percent below this time last year.

So while it’s wonderful that we’re seeing these sequential improvements, it’s important to remember that the industry is still fairly deep in the abyss and has a long way to go before it climbs out.

Just hours after Julius Genachowski, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, unveiled his open Internet proposal, a number of Republican senators stepped forward to oppose it. Arguing that Net Neutrality will “impede investment and innovation of new technologies,” Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R., Texas) proposed an amendment to an Interior Department appropriations bill that would bar the FCC from using federal funds to implement the proposal.

“I am deeply concerned by the direction the FCC appears to be heading,” Hutchison, the ranking Republican on the Senate Commerce Committee, said in a statement. “Even during a severe downturn, America has experienced robust investment and innovation in network performance and online content and applications. For that innovation to continue, we must tread lightly when it comes to new regulations. Where there have been a handful of questionable actions in the past on the part of a few companies, the commission and the marketplace have responded swiftly.”

Joining her in proposing the amendment were Senators John Thune (R., S.D.), Sam Brownback (R., Kan.), David Vitter (R., La.), Jim DeMint (R., S.C.), and John Ensign (R., Nev.), who had this to say in a statement of his own:

“In this struggling economy, any industry that is able to thrive should be allowed to do so without meddlesome government interference that could stifle innovation. We must avoid burdensome government regulations that micromanage private businesses or that limit the ability of companies to provide what their customers want. The Internet has flourished in large part because of a lack of government interference; I see no need to change that now.”

Nor does AT&T (T), which–coincidentally, I’m sure–happens to be a top-20 donor not just for Ensign and Hutchison, but for the four other senators who would block Genachowski’s initiative as well. Said Jim Cicconi, AT&T’s senior executive vice president of external and legislative affairs: “AT&T would be very disappointed if [the FCC] has already drawn a conclusion to regulate wireless services despite the absence of any compelling evidence of problems or abuse that would warrant government intervention.”

Just hours after Julius Genachowski, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, unveiled his open Internet proposal, a number of Republican senators stepped forward to oppose it. Arguing that Net Neutrality will “impede investment and innovation of new technologies,” Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R., Texas) proposed an amendment to an Interior Department appropriations bill that would bar the FCC from using federal funds to implement the proposal.

“I am deeply concerned by the direction the FCC appears to be heading,” Hutchison, the ranking Republican on the Senate Commerce Committee, said in a statement. “Even during a severe downturn, America has experienced robust investment and innovation in network performance and online content and applications. For that innovation to continue, we must tread lightly when it comes to new regulations. Where there have been a handful of questionable actions in the past on the part of a few companies, the commission and the marketplace have responded swiftly.”

Joining her in proposing the amendment were Senators John Thune (R., S.D.), Sam Brownback (R., Kan.), David Vitter (R., La.), Jim DeMint (R., S.C.), and John Ensign (R., Nev.), who had this to say in a statement of his own:

“In this struggling economy, any industry that is able to thrive should be allowed to do so without meddlesome government interference that could stifle innovation. We must avoid burdensome government regulations that micromanage private businesses or that limit the ability of companies to provide what their customers want. The Internet has flourished in large part because of a lack of government interference; I see no need to change that now.”

Nor does AT&T (T), which–coincidentally, I’m sure–happens to be a top-20 donor not just for Ensign and Hutchison, but for the four other senators who would block Genachowski’s initiative as well. Said Jim Cicconi, AT&T’s senior executive vice president of external and legislative affairs: “AT&T would be very disappointed if [the FCC] has already drawn a conclusion to regulate wireless services despite the absence of any compelling evidence of problems or abuse that would warrant government intervention.”

Global mobile handset sales fell at a record pace in the first quarter of 2009. And they’re likely to do so once again in the second. That’s the grim news today from Gartner, which reports that first-quarter sales of handsets fell to 269 million units, down 14.5 percent from the fourth quarter of 2008 and 9.4 percent from a year earlier.

“There were some signs of a recovery in markets such as North America and China, but overall sales in the first quarter of 2009 registered the biggest quarter-on-quarter contraction since Gartner began monitoring the market on a quarterly basis in 2001,” said Gartner research director Carolina Milanesi. “We really don’t see demand stabilizing before the second half of 2010.”

Demand for low-end mobile phones, that is. Smart phones are doing just fine. Their sales rose 12.7 percent to 36 million units. That’s 13.5 percent of all mobile devices sold in the first quarter, up from 11 percent a year earlier. The chief beneficiaries of this trend: Apple (AAPL) and Research in Motion (RIMM).

Apple doubled its share of the smart phone market in the first quarter of 2009, nabbing 10.8 percent of worldwide sales, up from 5.3 percent in the first quarter of 2008. The company sold 3.9 million iPhones during Q1 2009, more than double the 1.7 million it sold in the first quarter of 2008. Meanwhile, RIM’s share of the smart phone market reached 19.9 percent in the first quarter, up from 13.3 per cent a year earlier. It sold 7.2 million BlackBerry devices to end users, up from 4.3 million in the same period a year earlier.

Incidentally, Nokia (NOK) remains the market leader in smart phones and handsets overall, though its share in both is declining. The company claimed 36.2 percent of the handset market in the first quarter of 2009, down from 39.1 percent in the first quarter of 2008. Its share of the smart phone market dropped to 41.2 percent from 45.1 percent during the same period.

How is it that smart phone makers like Apple and RIM are defying a downturn that’s playing havoc with their dumbphone-manufacturing colleagues? Touchscreens and app stores.

Said Gartner analyst Roberta Cozza: “Much of the smartphone growth during the first quarter of 2009 was driven by touchscreen products, both in midtier and high-end devices. ‘Touch for the sake of touch’ was enough of a driver in the midtier space, but tighter integration with applications and services around music, mobile email, and Internet browsing made the difference at the high end of the market.”

Good news for Palm (PALM), which is bringing a device that fits that bill to market on June 6.

Here’s the memo Forbes distributed to his staff this afternoon:

Various media outlets today noted that Roger McNamee of Elevation Partners has stepped off the Forbes Media board and that this portends an imminent round of additional cuts. It does not.

Cutting costs has been necessary at Forbes and virtually every other company in response to the unprecedented economic downturn. We are doing what is necessary for Forbes to get through these difficult times. It is critical to remember, however, that while coping with current conditions, we are also pursuing new initiatives, the latest being ForbesWoman. We are actively examining a number of other new ventures.

Forbes continues to outperform its competitors. The brand is stronger today worldwide than ever before. In a few days I am going to India for the launch of Forbes India, our eleventh local edition and the first of its kind in India. No other business brand has a larger worldwide audience offline and online. At 5.4 million, readership of Forbes Magazine itself is at an all-time high, and Forbes Digital attracts some 40 million unique visitors each month.

Let us also remember that in 2001-2002 in the aftermath of the tech bubble bursting, and particularly after 9/11, magazine advertising plunged. We had to take many painful steps at that time as well. There were many who said we should shut down the then money-losing Forbes.com. We did not, and it went on to great success. Now, just as then, we are contending with crisis but also planting seeds of our future success.

As for the Forbes Media board, several Elevation partners have rotated on it. Bret Pearlman has been involved from day one.  And Roger McNamee is still very much engaged with the company, particularly web strategy and technology.

We fully understand the concerns that the present difficult environment causes. We want to thank everyone for their hard work. We profoundly believe that the steps being taken, not only short-term painful ones, but also new growth initiatives, will make Forbes stronger than ever when economic recovery comes.

From The Wall Street Journal:

“Microsoft Corp. may re-evaluate its plans for job cuts, its chief executive said Tuesday, suggesting more reductions could be in store if the U.S. economic downturn worsens.

‘In case the situation gets dramatically worse in the U.S., we will have to rework’ our plan, Chief Executive Steve Ballmer said at a news conference without elaborating.”

Here’s one reason why Ballmer didn’t feel the need to elaborate: He said the exact same thing last week.

Here’s the quote, from a companywide memo distributed when Microsoft (MSFT) announced its second phase of mass layoffs:

“As we move forward, we will continue to closely monitor the impact of the economic downturn on the company and if necessary, take further actions on our cost structure including additional job eliminations.”

To reiterate: Ballmer, whose company has remained dour about the economy even as investors and other forecasters (like Rupert Murdoch) have shown more optimism, refuses to say he’s done firing people for the year. But he’s not saying he will fire more people. My hunch: If you ask him next week, he’ll say the same thing.