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	<title>AllThingsD &#187; e-voting</title>
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		<title>Got a &quot;Verifiable Paper Trail&quot; for Those Phantom Voters?</title>
		<link>http://allthingsd.com/20080912/got-a-verifiable-paper-trail-for-those-phantom-voters/</link>
		<comments>http://allthingsd.com/20080912/got-a-verifiable-paper-trail-for-those-phantom-voters/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2008 23:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>John Paczkowski</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Computer Security Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daniel Murphy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[database]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diebold Election Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[e-voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[election]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[electronic voting machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Paczkowski]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[memory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michelle Shafer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[November elections]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Premier Election Solutions]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Santa Barbara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sequoia Voting Systems]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/?p=4966</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If one set out to design electronic voting machines that undermine voter confidence and threaten the integrity and accuracy of the whole election process, it would be hard to outdo those of Premier Election Solutions, formerly Diebold Election Systems. But Sequoia Voting Systems is trying--really trying.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/files/2008/09/slotmachine.jpg" alt="" title="slotmachine" width="200" height="297" class="alignright size-full wp-image-4968" />If one set out to design electronic voting machines that undermine voter confidence and threaten the integrity and accuracy of the whole election process, it would be hard to outdo those of <a href="http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/20070806/diebold-source-code-review/">Premier Election Solutions, formerly Diebold Election Systems</a> (DBD).</p>
<p>But Sequoia Voting Systems is trying&#8211;<i>really trying</i>. Earlier this week <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/10/AR2008091000716_pf.html">thousands of phantom votes were cast in a Washington D.C. primary election</a> that used Sequoia&#8217;s machines. This not a week after the Computer Security Group at the University of California at Santa Barbara demonstrated how astonishingly simple it is to <a href="http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/">hack the company&#8217;s e-voting systems</a>.</p>
<p>Election officials initially blamed the cock-up on some defective memory in one of Sequoia&#8217;s machines. But the company denies this. &#8220;There&#8217;s absolutely nothing wrong with the [District's election] database,&#8221; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/09/12/ST2008091200149.html">spokesperson Michelle Shafer insisted</a>. &#8220;There&#8217;s absolutely no problem with the machines in the polling places. No. No.&#8221;</p>
<p>OK. But if that&#8217;s the case, why were thousands of phantom votes recorded in the election? The answer to that question is particularly troubling: Sequoia doesn&#8217;t know. Neither does the D.C. Board of Elections. &#8220;All I can tell you is that we&#8217;re looking into it,&#8221; said Daniel Murphy, a spokesman for the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics.</p>
<p>Well, that&#8217;s reassuring. Especially with the November elections nearly upon us &#8230;</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Got a "Verifiable Paper Trail" for Those Phantom Voters?</title>
		<link>http://allthingsd.com/20080912/got-a-verifiable-paper-trail-for-those-phantom-voters-2/</link>
		<comments>http://allthingsd.com/20080912/got-a-verifiable-paper-trail-for-those-phantom-voters-2/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2008 23:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>John Paczkowski</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Computer Security Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daniel Murphy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[database]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diebold Election Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[e-voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[election official]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic voting machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Paczkowski]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[memory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michelle Shafer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[November elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[polling place]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Premier Election Solutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[primary election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Santa Barbara]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sequoia Voting Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[University of California]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vote]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Washington D.C.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yahoo]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/?p=4966</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If one set out to design electronic voting machines that undermine voter confidence and threaten the integrity and accuracy of the whole election process, it would be hard to outdo those of Premier Election Solutions, formerly Diebold Election Systems. But Sequoia Voting Systems is trying--really trying.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/files/2008/09/slotmachine.jpg" alt="" title="slotmachine" width="200" height="297" class="alignright size-full wp-image-4968" />If one set out to design electronic voting machines that undermine voter confidence and threaten the integrity and accuracy of the whole election process, it would be hard to outdo those of <a href="http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/20070806/diebold-source-code-review/">Premier Election Solutions, formerly Diebold Election Systems</a> (DBD).</p>
<p>But Sequoia Voting Systems is trying&#8211;<i>really trying</i>. Earlier this week <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/10/AR2008091000716_pf.html">thousands of phantom votes were cast in a Washington D.C. primary election</a> that used Sequoia&#8217;s machines. This not a week after the Computer Security Group at the University of California at Santa Barbara demonstrated how astonishingly simple it is to <a href="http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/">hack the company&#8217;s e-voting systems</a>. </p>
<p>Election officials initially blamed the cock-up on some defective memory in one of Sequoia&#8217;s machines. But the company denies this. &#8220;There&#8217;s absolutely nothing wrong with the [District's election] database,&#8221; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/09/12/ST2008091200149.html">spokesperson Michelle Shafer insisted</a>. &#8220;There&#8217;s absolutely no problem with the machines in the polling places. No. No.&#8221;</p>
<p>OK. But if that&#8217;s the case, why were thousands of phantom votes recorded in the election? The answer to that question is particularly troubling: Sequoia doesn&#8217;t know. Neither does the D.C. Board of Elections. &#8220;All I can tell you is that we&#8217;re looking into it,&#8221; said Daniel Murphy, a spokesman for the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics.</p>
<p>Well, that&#8217;s reassuring. Especially with the November elections nearly upon us &#8230;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Premier Continues Proud Tradition of Diebold E-Voting Screw-Ups</title>
		<link>http://allthingsd.com/20080822/diebold-premier/</link>
		<comments>http://allthingsd.com/20080822/diebold-premier/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 23:58:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>John Paczkowski</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antivirus software]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dave Byrd]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diebold Elections Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[e-voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[election official]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic voting systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Paczkowski]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[minibar key]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ohio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Premier Election Solutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[primary election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[software]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[source code error]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/?p=3783</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[So the hundreds of votes that were dropped in Ohio’s March primary elections? The ones that Premier Election Solutions, formerly called Diebold Election Systems, insisted were caused by faulty antivirus software and not a critical source code error?
They were caused by a source code error.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>
Diebold Elections Systems is changing its name to Premier Election Solutions. The change to Premier signifies a new beginning for the company.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8211; <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=106584&amp;p=irol-newsArticle&amp;ID=1041296&amp;highlight=">Diebold Press Release, Aug.  16, 2007</a>
</p></blockquote>
<p>So the hundreds of votes that were dropped in Ohio&#8217;s March primary elections? The ones that Premier Election Solutions, <a href="http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/20070817/diebold-renaming/">formerly called Diebold Election Systems</a> (DBD), insisted were caused by faulty antivirus software and not a critical source code error?</p>
<p>They were caused by a <a href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/the-trail/2008/08/21/ohio_voting_machines_contained.html">source code error</a>&#8211;one that&#8217;s been present in the company&#8217;s software for the past decade. Said Premier (Diebold) President Dave Byrd, &#8220;We are indeed distressed that our previous analysis of this issue was in error.&#8221;</p>
<p>Yeah, I bet you are. But not nearly as distressed as the voters who will use the company&#8217;s machines in upcoming elections. Remember, Premier (Diebold) is the company that designed its <a href="http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/summary.html">widely</a> <a href="http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/27675.html">criticized</a> electronic voting systems in such a way that the the locks protecting them from tampering can be picked open with a <a href="http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1064">hotel minibar key</a>. The company posted a detailed <a href="http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1113">photograph of its authorized key</a>, showing size, shape, and cut pattern, on its online store. It&#8217;s the company whose e-voting machines once relied on <a href="http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/20070806/diebold-source-code-review/">hard-coded security passwords like &#8220;1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8&#8243; and &#8220;11111.&#8221;</a> It&#8217;s the company that <a href="http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_12.php#004286">evaded election transparency laws</a> in North Carolina. It&#8217;s the company that can&#8217;t seem to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/19/AR2006101901818_pf.html">safeguard its source code</a>. And it&#8217;s the company <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/25/AR2006102501907_pf.html">that modified its machines</a> without notifying election officials. <a href="http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/10/60563">Twice</a>.</p>
<p>So much for that &#8220;new beginning.&#8221; Once a Diebold, always a Diebold, eh?</p>
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