Then word came, via AllThingsD, that something big was coming from the board of directors. And as AllThingsD first reported (again), HP directors made one of their own, Meg Whitman, the former eBay CEO who had become a director earlier this year, the new CEO. Léo Apotheker resigned, but don’t cry for him, because according to his contract, he made out rather well. Even before it was made official, investors applauded the move, sending HP shares skyward.

Analysts did what they always do, and, well, analyzed. And though it looked more like drama criticism, it’s not as if HP hasn’t known boardroom dramas before. Finally, the deed was done, meaning it was time to hold a conference call, but not before talking first to Kara Swisher of AllThingsD.

I got to talk to Whitman and HP Chairman Ray Lane yesterday, too, but I had to wait until after the conference call. With so many critics screaming that Whitman has no experience running an enterprise hardware company — and let’s be honest, there aren’t that many who do — I asked her to elaborate on the defense, made on the conference call with analysts, that her experience as a buyer of enterprise technology, during her years as CEO at eBay, provided important experience that will help her be an effective CEO at HP. I also asked about Autonomy, the British software firm that HP is in the process of acquiring for $10 billion, and how it will fit within HP; about the company’s plans for cloud services; and about the state of the HP brand amid all the corporate mishegas that has unfolded in the last several months.

AllThingsD: Meg, the main criticism of you, since you’ve been named CEO of HP, is that your primary experience before was at eBay, which is a consumer-facing company. The response on yesterday’s conference call has been that at eBay you were a purchaser of a lot of enterprise technology and that this gives you some important relevant experience. I get the point, but could you elaborate on it a bit? How does having been an enterprise buyer help you be HP’s CEO?

Whitman: What HP needs now more than anything else is management skills, communication skills and a commitment to executional excellence, all of which I know well, and are sort of core competencies from my 35-year career in business. I know technology because I ran a company whose very existence would not have been possible without it, and was a very significant buyer of technology products. And so that brings me a unique buyer’s perspective. But I have not spent 35 years in the enterprise business. Add so what that means is that I will be relying heavily on Dave Donatelli; on Todd Bradley; on the senior executives at HP; and also, frankly, on Ray Lane, who was at Oracle for many years, and EDS, and who knows this space well. So I think what customers will get is that one plus one equals three.

Lane: I agree with that. What we need here, and what we didn’t have before, is operational execution, communication skills, getting the team on the same page and leading them. The CEOs of $130 billion companies are not leading the technology development of those companies. I think Meg can go into any enterprise and visit with any CIO or CEO and do really well. So whether it is the technology side or the sales side, I don’t think anyone is giving her enough credit on those fronts. She can do just fine. And then on top of that she has strong operating executives under her who do know the enterprise business. But right now it is the need for leadership of the people, a focus on executing and operating. I could point back to Lou Gerstner at IBM, or even my own days at Oracle. When I joined Oracle, people thought the board had lost its mind, because I was a consultant at Booz Allen. People scoffed and said ‘How is a consultant going to lead the worldwide sales force at Oracle, a trained wolf pack?’ And somehow I figured it out. And I knew nothing about software, but I learned, and I learned from Larry Ellison, who is one of the best.

I want to talk a bit about Autonomy, and about unstructured data. You made a comment about that when you talked with Kara Swisher of AllThingsD yesterday. Talk to me about where you see Autonomy fitting within HP. Do you still intend to let it be independent? How do you see the alignment shaping up?

Whitman: It’s a big and fast-growing market. Of all the data out there, about 15 percent of it is structured and 85 percent of it is unstructured. And the unstructured data is growing by leaps and bounds. There are not a lot of good software companies that can help companies manage unstructured data and help companies make business decisions based on what they see in that unstructured data. So what we hope to do with Autonomy, and I’m enthusiastic about this acquisition, is take what is fabulous about Autonomy — they have a leading position in the marketplace — and put it through the very powerful HP distribution system. And I think what Mike Lynch is excited about — he is the founder and CEO of Autonomy — is taking this great product and getting it into more people’s hands. And we just need to grow this company as fast as we can; extend our lead and our accumulated experience in this area. So that’s the plan for Autonomy.

Lane: Yeah, I think the synergies are great, and I think it makes a lot of sense. It will make a lot of sense to customers if HP engages them in a dialogue of managing unstructured data.

You don’t think HP paid too much for Autonomy?

Whitman: You know what? It is what it is.

Lane: We wish we could have bought it for cheaper, but it was the market price. People thought we overpaid for 3Par, and you know what? We’re hitting it out of the park.

Is HP still going to be player in cloud services? That was a big commitment that Léo made in March. How far along is that plan?

Lane: Absolutely. The cloud is way ahead of plan. So our cloud services have gone live. So that is absolutely part of the plan, yes.

Meg, a lot of the same people who applauded your selection to HP’s board of directors are criticizing your selection as CEO. Why do you think there’s a disconnect?

Whitman: I don’t know. There’s always people who have different points of view on things. What I have to do — and I said this on the conference call — is lead this company, make it a great company again and fulfill its destiny as the icon of Silicon Valley and of California, and deliver the results. I will have to prove myself by delivering the results. If we’re going to restore the confidence that investors have in us, and that employees have in us, we have to deliver. We have to mean what we say and say what we mean and deliver the results. And that is what I intend to deliver.

Meg, you have a lot of history managing brands. I’m thinking of the job you had managing brands for Procter & Gamble. What’s wrong and what’s right about HP’s brand right now?

Whitman: I think HP is known as the world’s largest provider of information technology, and we are a trusted brand. We are a worldwide brand that touches both consumers and businesses. If you’re an enterprise, we have full suite of solutions. I know that when I bought enterprise hardware and software at eBay, I wanted one person to choke when something went wrong. I wanted one supplier to go to and say ‘Hey, this is not working.’ And so I think we have a fabulous brand in a world where technology is increasingly fundamental. I will say — and Ray would say this as well — I think we need crisper communications with all the constituencies. I think on Aug. 18 we confused people. We didn’t mean to do that, but we did. And so I think we’ve got some work to do around communicating crisply and cleanly about what we’re about — the moves that we’re making — to employees, customers, shareholders and, frankly, to the press.

It also said that it is engaged in talks with the British software concern Autonomy. Bloomberg News reported earlier today that HP was in talks to acquire Autonomy for about $10 billion, which would make it HP’s third-largest acquisition ever, after Compaq in 2001 ($32 billion) and EDS in 2008 (about $16 billion).

In addition, HP said it would discontinue operations of the webOS unit that came with last year’s acquisition of Palm, the handheld computing company for which it paid nearly $2 billion. Ina Fried has more about that here, but obviously the revelation that the TouchPad tablet device isn’t selling at Best Buy was an important indication that the webOS business was not long for this world.

The news came along with quarterly results that missed the consensus expectations of analysts. Revenue was $31.2 billion versus a consensus of $31.19 billion. Per-share earnings were $1.10, a penny short better than the consensus of $1.09. While HP managed to squeak by expectations on the earnings front, its outlook isn’t getting any better. It reduced its revenue forecast for the year to a range of $127.2 billion to $127.6 billion, down from its previously guided range of $129 billion to $130 billion. It also cut its estimated per-share earnings for the full year to a range of $4.82 to $4.86, down from $5. HP shares set new 52-week lows today, finally settling at $29.51, down 6 percent. The shares have lost nearly 30 percent since the start of the year, and are down more than 40 percent from their 52-week high set in February.

Update: In the sudden onslaught of HP news I misread the press release and said that HP missed the consensus by a penny per share when in fact it beat the consensus by a penny per share. Sorry about that.

A second update: Now HP has confirmed the terms of the Autonomy acquisition. HP has reached a deal to pay $42.11 a share for Autonomy in cash. The deal represents a premium of about 64 percent from Autonomy’s closing price yesterday. The deal will close by the end of the year.

And if that weren’t enough HP news for you, the company named John Visentin as executive vice president of HP Enterprise Services, effective immediately. Visentin previously led HP Enterprise Services for the Americas. Prior to joining HP, Visentin held several senior executive positions at IBM and, all told, has 27 years in the information technology industry. He replaces Tom Iannotti, who announced his retirement earlier this year.

Here’s the announcement. I’ll have more as I go through everything.

HP Confirms Discussions with Autonomy Corporation plc Regarding Possible Business Combination; Makes Other Announcements

Press Release Source: HP On Thursday August 18, 2011, 3:02 pm

PALO ALTO, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)– HP (NYSE:HPQ – News) today commented on the recent announcement by Autonomy Corporation plc (LSE:AU.L.l – News). HP confirms that it is in discussions with Autonomy regarding a possible offer for the company.

HP also reported that it plans to announce that its board of directors has authorized the exploration of strategic alternatives for its Personal Systems Group (PSG). HP will consider a broad range of options that may include, among others, a full or partial separation of PSG from HP through a spin-off or other transaction.

In addition, HP reported that it plans to announce that it will discontinue operations for webOS devices, specifically the TouchPad and webOS phones. HP will continue to explore options to optimize the value of webOS software going forward.

HP today announced preliminary results for the third fiscal quarter 2011, with revenue of $31.2 billion compared with $30.7 billion one year ago.

In the third quarter, preliminary GAAP diluted earnings per share (EPS) was $0.93 and non-GAAP diluted EPS was $1.10, compared with third quarter fiscal 2010 GAAP diluted EPS of $0.75 and non-GAAP diluted EPS of $1.08. Non-GAAP diluted EPS estimates exclude after-tax costs related primarily to the amortization of purchased intangible assets of approximately $0.17 per share and $0.33 per share in the third quarter of fiscal 2011 and fiscal 2010, respectively.

For the fourth fiscal quarter of 2011, HP estimates revenue of approximately $32.1 billion to $32.5 billion, GAAP diluted EPS in the range of $0.44 to $0.55, and non-GAAP diluted EPS in the range of $1.12 to $1.16. Non-GAAP diluted EPS guidance excludes after-tax costs of approximately $0.61 to $0.68 per share, related primarily to restructuring and shutdown costs associated with webOS devices, the amortization and impairment of purchased intangibles, restructuring charges and acquisition-related charges.

HP estimates full-year FY11 revenue will be approximately $127.2 billion to $127.6 billion, down from its previous estimate of $129 billion to $130 billion. FY11 GAAP diluted EPS is expected to be in the range of $3.59 to $3.70, down from its previous estimate of at least $4.27, and FY11 non-GAAP diluted EPS is expected to be in the range of $4.82 to $4.86, down from its previous estimate of at least $5.00. FY11 non-GAAP diluted EPS estimates exclude after-tax costs of approximately $1.16 to 1.23 per share, related primarily to restructuring and shutdown costs associated with webOS devices, the amortization and impairment of purchased intangibles, restructuring charges and acquisition-related charges.

HP will host a conference call with the financial community today at 2 p.m. PT / 5 p.m. ET to discuss these announcements well as HP’s third quarter 2011 financial results. The call is accessible via an audio webcast at www.hp.com/investor/2011q3webcast.

About HP

HP creates new possibilities for technology to have a meaningful impact on people, businesses, governments and society. The world’s largest technology company, HP brings together a portfolio that spans printing, personal computing, software, services and IT infrastructure at the convergence of the cloud and connectivity, creating seamless, secure, context-aware experiences for a connected world. More information about HP is available at http://www.hp.com.

Related posts

• Hewlett-Packard Says Goodbye to PCs, webOS
• HP Pulls Plug on webOS Hardware, Leaves OS Future in Doubt
• HP And webOS: But They Seemed So Happy Together!
• Liveblogging HP’s “Everything Including the Kitchen Sink” Conference Call
• HP’s Apotheker: We Struck Out with WebOS, but Maybe Someone Else Wants a Swing?
• Viral Video: Like Palm’s Creepy Naked Lady, TouchPad’s Floating Celeb Heads Get the HP Boot
• Licensing webOS May Not Be Much of an Option for HP
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• With HP’s Raising of the World’s Biggest White Flag, Will Jon Rubinstein and Todd Bradley Surrender Too?

Plaintiffs in the lawsuit are seeking records related to Hurd’s departure from HP in August, including a letter that accused him of sexually harassing Jodie Fisher, a sometimes-actress who worked as a contractor for HP. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is also looking into the possibility that Hurd told Fisher about HP’s then-confidential plans to acquire IT services firm EDS.

Hurd has been trying to keep the letter from being made public, and argued to the judge that since it is his personal property, he should be allowed to join the lawsuit as a party to that end. In the motion, Hurd’s lawyers argue that the letter was sent to “achieve private resolution of a potential dispute” between Hurd and Fisher.

Mark Hurd doesn’t want you to read the letter that set in motion his ouster from the top job at Hewlett-Packard.

This is understandable, but one has to wonder–if the letter were to be made public, would that be so bad?

The episode involving the sometimes actress and former HP contractor Jodie Fisher turned into one of the more prurient news events of late in Silicon Valley.

While the nature of the relationship was much debated–although both denied it was sexual–attention quickly turned to expense reports Hurd had filed that HP alleged covered up his travels to meet with Fisher.

It all started with a letter sent by Fisher’s lawyers to HP that contained allegations of sexual harassment, which supposedly occurred during a period running from 2007 to 2009.

And as The Wall Street Journal reported today, the letter also alleged that during one of their visits in 2008, Hurd told her about about HP’s then-confidential plan to acquire IT services firm EDS.

It’s this significant allegation that has attracted the attention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, as the Journal reported earlier this week.

That’s because when CEOs talk out of school about confidential deals in progress, shareholder interests are at stake, and questions arise about what was said and to whom.

And while Fisher isn’t said to have traded on the information, making SEC charges ultimately unlikely, loose lips on Hurd’s part would be a very big no-no.

The letter is also evidence in a shareholder lawsuit against HP before the Delaware Chancery Court. Plaintiffs want the letter, currently sealed, to be made public. Hurd’s lawyers have filed a motion asking that it remain sealed. The judge will rule on the issue early next year.

Given what’s publicly known about the letter so far–and about a second letter from Fisher that followed it–one has to wonder whether Hurd might be better off if the judge rules in favor of disclosure, even if the letter contains some personally embarrassing allegations about his behavior.

We’ll see. The worst thing so far emerging from them is that Hurd appears to have used HP funds to pay for Fisher’s travel and meals and done a little administrative tap dancing with his expense reports. On top of that, the letter alleges that he talked too much about a pending deal.

And while the letter did contain allegations of sexual harassment, Fisher went on to say in public that she never intended for the matter to cost Hurd his job. And she later sent the board a second letter recanting certain unspecified “inaccuracies.”

Thus, the second letter may cancel out some of the more salacious actions alleged in the first. An internal investigation by HP found that Hurd didn’t violate the company’s own sexual harassment policy. And Hurd eventually reached a private settlement with Fisher.

But maintaining the seal on the letters only fans the public curiosity about them. A little sunlight on both letters may reveal their contents to be, well, mostly boring, even if marginally titillating.

And this may go a long way toward repairing Hurd’s dented reputation.

Releasing the controversial letters will also give HP shareholders something they’ve wanted since this entire episode began: The full story.

HP lost a lot of its market value when Hurd left, and its share price has not yet recovered. And Hurd wound up working for a competitor, Oracle.

None of this is an optimal outcome by any reasonable measure. So, it’s fair to say HP shareholders are entitled to a much more thorough explanation of the circumstances that led its board to show Hurd the door.

Now as head of HP Networking, he has a job that is no less daunting: Wrestling with none other than Cisco Systems, the powerful grandaddy of the networking business. HP’s networking unit, recently bolstered by its $2.7 billion acquisition of 3Com last year, caught some attention this week with an audacious promotion offering networking customers a 20 percent discount on certain products if they trade in old Cisco gear.

To be fair, HP has yet to take much business away from Cisco. As The Wall Street Journal noted, Cisco has so far held on to its 70 percent share of the enterprise Ethernet switching market in Q3, up from 67 percent a year ago, according to the research firm Infonetics. HP’s share was 11 percent, the same share that 3Com had before it was part of HP.

Still, it’s an interesting time to be trading barbs with Cisco, in part because it appears vulnerable given its uncertain market outlook when it reported earnings last month, but also because it’s eyeing some of HP’s home turf for expansion.

I met up with Haas at HP Headquarters in Palo Alto recently to talk about how the matchup with Cisco is shaping up, and what to expect from HP in 2011.

NewEnterprise: Marius, let’s start with the big question about the coming year. You were deeply involved with the EDS deal and several HP deals before that. Is there still an appetite for big deals in IT or at HP?

Marius Haas: “It’s not going to stop. The big are going to get bigger. The appetite for some of the niche technology players to get some funding so they can grow to a sufficient scale is not gone. Now it’s becoming clear that Cisco, Oracle, IBM and HP are all pretty much starting to build out their end-to-end stacks and I don’t see any stop to the deal-making. In order to get the kind of muscle you need to compete in this market you have to be pretty big and you have to be global.”

NE: So HP is not done doing deals?

MH: “No.”

NE: What kind of deals might we see?

MH: “I’ll give you a hint. Look at who our new CEO and Chairman [former SAP CEO Léo Apotheker] is. You can probably draw a conclusion that maybe we’ll continue to expand in the software arena, and then move up the stack. That’s a logical path he could be taking.

NE: Let’s talk about the competition, specifically Cisco–a networking company that’s going after the data center and IT. You run the networking division of an IT company. Talk to me about that dynamic.

MH: “We like the position we’re in. We have all the things you need in order to bring together and deliver a sort of holistic kind of cloud strategy for customers. It takes a lot of IP and we’re the only company on the planet that has it all. Servers, storage, networking, management software, services. And all the devices as well. No one else has that. And Cisco doesn’t have it. They will come from their position of strength which is networking, but they are going to have to partner to deliver the broader ecosystem. It’s easy to put on paper, but harder to deliver.

“They’re used to their network model with proprietary products. Customers are saying they don’t want proprietary stuff. They want something that’s standards-based, interoperable and at a much lower cost. Our offering is resonating. We don’t see the kind of slowness they are seeing. And the enterprise customers are telling us they no longer want a single-vendor-dominated networking market. They want competition for their business.”

NE: So where are you seeing demand?

MH: “Historically HP before we acquired 3Com was strong in the mid-market and in the edge of the enterprise. We were strong in the K-12, local government, hospitality and health care segments. Now we’re seeing broader momentum in the enterprise, especially from companies who are modernizing their environment and getting ready for the cloud. People are getting tired of paying a premium for Cisco. And you’ve got about $9 billion worth of gear from Cisco that is going end of life soon. Out of our top 1,000 enterprise accounts, 458 are doing proof of concept trials with us. People are now convinced we are that second horse in the race.”

Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) has finally named a new CEO, and, despite our prediction that it would choose an internal candidate like Todd Bradley or Anne Livermore, the company instead looked to an outsider.

On Thursday afternoon, HP named Léo Apotheker–former CEO of SAP (SAP)–as its new chief executive officer.

And, in a jab at Oracle–which hired former HP CEO Mark Hurd after his ouster–it tapped Ray Lane, a former president and COO at Oracle (ORCL), as its non-executive chairman of the board. Lane is currently a managing partner at VC powerhouse Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers.

Interesting choices. Particularly Apotheker, who was pushed out of SAP this past February after less than a year on the job. (He served as co-CEO with Henning Kagermann for a few years prior.)

Cathie Lesjak, who has been serving as interim CEO, will return to her previous role of CFO on November 1, when the new appointments become effective.

In a statement announcing the move, HP board member Robert Ryan said the company chose to hire Apotheker because he’s “a strategic thinker with a passion for technology, wide-reaching global experience, and proven operational discipline.”

At $40.80, HP shares are down about three percent on the news. Seems investors aren’t too keen on Apotheker’s appointment, even after weeks of leadership uncertainty.

Here’s the release:

Léo Apotheker Named CEO and President of HP

Ray Lane Joins HP as Non-Executive Chairman of the Board

PALO ALTO, Calif., Sept. 30, 2010–The Board of Directors of HP today announced the election of Léo Apotheker as Chief Executive Officer and President. Apotheker, who previously served as CEO of SAP, will also join HP’s Board of Directors. The Board also elected Ray Lane, Managing Partner at Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, as a new member of the Board and designated him as non- executive Chairman. Both elections are effective November 1.

During Apotheker’s more than 20 years at SAP, he was a driving force in making it the largest business software applications company in the world. Apotheker helped develop and implement the most significant changes in SAP history. During his tenure, he transformed R&D and technology platforms and expanded business models and customer segments. Apotheker also helped lead SAP to 18 consecutive quarters of double-digit software revenue growth between 2004 and 2009.

Lane has served on the Board of Directors of more than 20 public and private companies and joined Kleiner Perkins in 2000. Previously, he served as President and Chief Operating Officer at Oracle Corporation. Earlier in his career, Lane also worked at Booz Allen Hamilton, EDS and IBM.

“Léo is a strategic thinker with a passion for technology, wide-reaching global experience and proven operational discipline–exactly what we were looking for in a CEO,” said Robert Ryan, lead independent director of the Board. “After more than two decades in the industry, he has a strong track record of driving technological innovation, building customer relationships and developing world- class teams.”

Ryan continued, “Léo has been a leader in anticipating the transformation taking place in our industry, and we believe he is uniquely positioned to help accelerate HP’s strategy. He has demonstrated success in the U.S. market and also has vast international experience – which will be a major asset as HP continues to expand globally, particularly in high-growth emerging markets. HP has the right assets and market positions, and now we have the best team to realize the company’s enormous potential.”

“HP has a powerful mix of businesses, products and services, one of the most innovative cultures in the industry, and an accomplished management team who have played a critical role in its success,” said Apotheker. “I am deeply honored to be joining the more than 300,000 dedicated HP employees.”

Apotheker continued, “Given HP’s diversified products and services, its financial strength, and its leadership position across markets, no other company is as well positioned to drive – and profit from – the revolutionary changes under way in the marketplace. As we move forward, HP will continue to be a valued partner with our customers as well as a fierce competitor. I look forward to working with the outstanding people at HP to write the next chapter in the company’s long and proud history.”

“I am excited to join the Board of this pioneering company, and look forward to working closely with Léo – and the rest of the Board and senior management team – as they capitalize on the changes taking place across the industry,” Lane said. “I have known and admired Léo for almost 20 years. He is ideally suited to build on HP’s strong foundation, leverage its many assets and keep the company at the forefront of innovation.”

Apotheker will succeed Cathie Lesjak, who was named interim CEO in August 2010. Lesjak, who has served as HP’s Chief Financial Officer since January 2007, remains CFO and continues to serve as a member of the Executive Council. Ryan said, “Cathie is and will continue to be an important part of HP. We are extremely fortunate to have one of the deepest, most talented senior management teams in the industry and to have someone of Cathie’s caliber lead HP during this interim period. On behalf of the entire Board, I would like to thank Cathie and our senior management team for maintaining HP’s focus on serving customers and continuing to execute our strategy.”

HP today said it will reduce its employee roster by 3,000, or one percent of its workforce, over the next few years. Nine thousand workers will lose their jobs, with 6,000 new staff to be hired in the same period.

Evidently, the completion of HP’s integration with EDS, which it bought in 2008 for nearly $14 billion, has made the move necessary. And the continuing automation of the company’s computer services business has made it possible.

“We think the next 5 to 10 years will be all about automation,” Ann Livermore, Executive VP of HP’s enterprise business said during a conference call about the ugly news this morning. “These changes will allow HP to reinvest in further growth….We have a chance to further accelerate our competitive advantage. This is a substantial opportunity for us and something that we think is a good opportunity for our clients as well.”

HP expects to take a $1 billion charge for the cuts and says it anticipates they will will ultimately generate the same amount in annual savings.

“I mean damn, did you even see the test
You got D’s, motherf*$@%&, D’s! Rosie Perez”
– Kanye West

No position in a company is more important than the CEO, and as a result, no job gets more scrutiny. Sadly, little of this analysis benefits CEOs, as most of the discussions happen behind their backs. This post is a step in the opposite direction. By describing how Andreessen Horowitz evaluates CEOs, I am at the same time describing what I think the job of the CEO is. Here are the key questions we ask:

Does the CEO know what to do?

Can the CEO get the company to do what she knows?

Did the CEO achieve the desired results against an appropriate set of objectives?

1. Does the CEO know what to do?

One should interpret this question as broadly as possible. Does the CEO know what to do in all matters all of the time? This includes matters of personnel, matters of financing, matters of product strategy, matters of goal sizing, matters of marketing. At a macro level, does the CEO set the right strategy for the company and know its implications in every detail of the company?

I evaluate two distinct facets of knowing what to do:

Strategy–At Andreessen Horowitz, we like to say that in good companies, the story and the strategy are the same thing. As a result, the proper output of all the strategic work is the story.

Decision-making–At the detailed level, the output of knowing what to do is the speed and quality of the CEO’s decisions.

The Strategy and the Story

The CEO must set the context that every employee operates within. This context gives meaning to the specific work that people do, aligns interests, enables decision-making and provides motivation. Well-structured goals and objectives contribute to the context, but they do not provide the whole story. More to the point, goals and objectives are not the story. The story of the company goes beyond quarterly or annual goals and gets to the hardcore question of why? Why should I join this company? Why should I be excited to work here? Why should I buy your product? Why should I invest in the company? Why is the world better off as a result of this company’s existence?

When a company clearly articulates its story, the context for everyone–employees, partners, customers, investors, and the press–becomes clear: When a company fails to tell its story, you hear phrases like:

“These reporters don’t get it.”

“Who is responsible for the strategy in this company?”

“We have great technology, but need marketing help.”

The CEO doesn’t have to be the creator of the vision. Nor does she have to be the creator of the story. But she must be the keeper of the vision and the story. As such, the CEO ensures that the company story is clear and compelling.

The story is not the mission statement; the story does not have to be succinct. It is the story. Companies can take as long as they need to tell it, but they must tell it and it must be compelling. A company without a story is a usually a company without a strategy.

Want to see a great company story? Read Jeff Bezos’s three-page letter he wrote to shareholders in 1997. In telling Amazon’s story in this extended from–not as mission statement, not as a tagline–Jeff got all the people who mattered on the same page about what Amazon (AMZN) was about.

Decision-making

Some employees make products, some make sales; the CEO makes decisions. Therefore, a CEO can most accurately be measured by the speed and quality of those decisions. Great decisions come from CEOs who display an elite combination of intelligence, logic, and courage.

Courage is particularly important, because every decision a CEO makes is based on incomplete information. In fact, at the time of the decision, the CEO will generally have less than 10 percent of the information typically present in the ensuing Harvard Business School case study. As a result, the CEO must have the courage to bet the company on a direction even though she does not know if the direction is right. The most difficult decisions (and often the most important) are difficult precisely because they will be deeply unpopular with the CEO’s most important constituencies (employees, investors, and customers).

In my personal experience, the best decision that I made in my career–the decision to sell the Loudcloud business to EDS and become Opsware the software company–would have lost by landslide had I put it to a vote with my employees, my investors or my customers.

As CEO, there is never enough time to gather all information needed to make a decision. The CEO must make hundreds of decisions big and small in the course of a typical week. The CEO cannot simply stop all other activities to gather comprehensive data and do exhaustive analysis to make that single decision. Knowing this, CEOs must be continuously and systematically gathering knowledge in their day-to-day activities so that they will have as much information as possible when the decision point presents itself.

In order to prepare to make any decision, the CEO must systematically acquire the knowledge of everything that might impact any decision that she might make. Questions such as:

What are the competitors likely to do?

What’s possible technically and in what timeframe?

What are the true capabilities of the organization and how can you maximize them?

How much financial risk does this imply?

What will the issues be, given your current product architecture?

Will the employees be energized or despondent about this promotion?

Great CEOs build exceptional strategies for gathering the required information continuously. They embed their quest for intelligence into all of their daily actions from staff meetings to customer meetings to 1:1s. Winning strategies are built on comprehensive knowledge gathered in every interaction the CEO has with an employee, a customer, a partner, an investor, and so on.

2. Can the CEO get the company to do what she knows?

If the CEO paints a compelling vision and makes fast, high-quality decisions, can she then get the company to execute on her vision and decisions? The first ingredient in being able to do this is leadership, as I outlined in a previous post, Notes on Leadership.

In addition, executing well requires a broad set of operational skills. The larger the organization, the more elaborate the requisite skill set.

In order for a company to execute a broad set of decisions and initiatives, it must:

Have the capacity to do so–in other words, the company must contain the necessary talent in the right positions to execute the strategy.

Be a place where every employees can get things accomplished–the employees must be motivated, communication must be strong, the amount of common knowledge must be vast, and the context must be clear.

Is the CEO building a world-class team?

The CEO is responsible for the executive team plus the fundamental interview and hiring processes for all employees. She must make sure that the company sources the best candidates and that the screening processes yield the candidates with the right combination of talent and skills. Ensuring the quality of the team is a core part of running the company. Great CEOs constantly assess whether or not they are building the best team.

The output of this capability is the quality of the team. It’s important to note that team quality is tightly tied to the specific needs of the company in the challenges that it faces at the point in time that it faces them. As a result, it’s quite possible that the executive team changes several times, but the team a) is high-quality the entire way and b) there is no attrition problem.

Is it is easy for employees to contribute to the mission?

The second part of the evaluation determines whether or not the CEO can effectively run the company. To test this, I like to ask this question: “How easy is it for any given individual contributor to get his or her job done?”

In well-run organizations, people can focus on their work (as opposed to politics and bureaucratic procedures) and have confidence that if they get their work done, good things will happen for both the company and them personally. By contrast, in a poor organization, people spend much of their time fighting organizational boundaries and broken processes.

While quite easy to describe, building a well-run organization requires a high level of skill. The skills required range from organizational design to performance management. They involve the incentive structure and the communication architecture that drives and enables every individual employee. When a CEO “fails to scale,” it’s usually along this dimension. In practice, very few CEOs get an “A” on this particular test.

Netflix’s CEO Reed Hastings put great effort into designing a system that enables employees to be maximally effective. His presentation on this design is called Reference Guide on our Freedom and Responsibility Culture. It walks through what Netflix (NFLX) values in its employees, how they screen for those values during the interview process, how they reinforce those values, and how they scale this system as the number of employees grows.

3. Results against objectives

When measuring results against objectives, start by making sure the objectives are correct. CEOs who excel at board management can “succeed” by setting objectives artificially low. Great CEOs who fail to pay attention to board management can “fail” by setting objectives too high. Early in a company’s development, objectives can be particularly misleading as nobody really knows the true size of the opportunity. Therefore, the first task in accurately measuring results is setting objectives correctly.

We also try to keep in mind that the size and nature of the opportunity varies quite a bit across companies. Hoping that VMware (VMW) can be as capital-light as SolarWinds (SWI) or trying to get Yelp to grow as fast as Twitter doesn’t make sense and can be quite destructive. CEOs should be evaluated against their company’s opportunity–not somebody else’s company. Let me share a funny story, which illustrates a CEO really owning delivering against results. This story is from Robin Li, CEO of Baidu (BIDU). He shares that on the day of Baidu’s IPO–usually one of an entrepreneur’s most exhilarating days of his entire life–he sat at his desk terrified. Why? Listen to how Robin owned delivering results:

In 2004, we raised our last round of VC money led by Draper Fisher Jurvetson…and Google, one of our great colleagues. Then a year later, in 2005, the company went public. The ideal price was $27 [the stock's initial offer price] and it closed on the first day at $122. It was great with us for many of the Baidu employees and for all of the Baidu investors. It was a very miserable thing for me because when I decided to take the company public, I was only prepared to deliver financial results that match the price of $27 or maybe a little higher, $30, $40. But I was really shocked to see that the price went to $122 on the first day. So that meant I needed to deliver real results that matches an expectation much, much higher than what I had prepared to do. But in any case, I thought I had no choice. So I put my head down and focused on operation, focused on technology, focused on the user’s experience, and I delivered.

Once we’ve taken all of this into account, we see that black-box results are a lagging indicator. And as they say in the mutual fund prospectuses, “past performance is no guarantee of future performance.” The white box CEO evaluation criteria–“does the CEO know what to do?” and “can the CEO get the company to do it?”–will do a much better job of predicting the future.

Closing Thought

CEO evaluation need not be a byzantine, unstated art. All people, including CEOs, will perform better on a test if they know the questions ahead of time.

Ben Horowitz is co-founder and general partner of Andreessen Horowitz. He co-founded Loudcloud, later renamed Opsware Inc., in 1999 and served as CEO of the company before it was acquired in 2007 by Hewlett-Packard. He was most recently vice president and general manager of Hewlett-Packard’s Business Technology Organization Unit.

The presentation catalyzed a movement. Start-ups everywhere adopted a lean, low-burn, low-investment model. To this day, companies seeking funding at our venture firm, Andreessen Horowitz, proudly proclaim in their pitch decks that they are raising tiny amounts of capital so they can run lean.

On the one hand, it is a fact that capital invested is negatively correlated with returns in the venture capital industry. Pumping too much money into a small start-up is unhealthy for both the company and the investor. On the other hand, Facebook has raised several hundred million dollars and is on track to produce fantastic returns for all of its investors.

So what’s a start-up to do? Much of what has been written and said about lean start-ups makes good sense. However, that advice is often incomplete, and some of the things left unsaid are the least intuitive. In this article, I will articulate some of those things left unsaid in arguing the case for the Fat Start-up.

Here is my central argument. There are only two priorities for a start-up:
Winning the market and not running out of cash. Running lean is not an end. For that matter, neither is running fat. Both are tactics that you use to win the market and not run out of cash before you do so. By making “running lean” an end, you may lose your opportunity to win the market, either because you fail to fund the R&D necessary to find product/market fit or you let a competitor out-execute you in taking the market. Sometimes running fat is the right thing to do.

What the hell do I know?

“Al Pacino couldn’t be no gangsta, DeNiro in ‘Casino’ he no gangsta
Wanna be, wanna see, wan’ get a shovel
dig Tookie up n*&%^!, cause he know gangstas”

–The Game

At this point, some of you are asking yourselves, “What the hell does Ben know? If he were really smart, then he’d know that thin is in.” It turns out that I have some experience in managing a fat start-up through the dot-com implosion of the early 2000s. This chart offers a brief summary of equity market history when I was CEO of Loudcloud and Opsware (click to enlarge):

Note that the Nasdaq index is very highly correlated to the start-up funding environment. During the two years I was CEO of Opsware, the Nasdaq fell 80 percent, far more than it has fallen during the current 2008-10 downturn. So the 2000-02 environment was at least as traumatic as this one for Silicon Valley companies–and arguably much worse.

Here is a brief summary of Loudcloud/Opsware’s fund-raising history during that time:

• September 1999: Loudcloud founded
• November 1999: Loudcloud raises $21 million at a $45 million pre-money valuation (Benchmark Capital is the lead investor)
• January 2000: Loudcloud borrows $45 million from Morgan Stanley (MS)
• June 2000: Loudcloud raises $120M at a $700M pre-money valuation
• March 2001: Loudcloud goes public on Nasdaq, raises $160 million and is valued in the public markets at approximately $480 million. Total funds raised to this point: $346 million.
• August 2002: Loudcloud sells the managed services business to EDS (this was the only actual business we had at the time) for $63.5 million and becomes a software company (and changes its name to Opsware).
• September 2002: Opsware trades for 35 cents per share or approximately a $28 million market cap.
• September 2007: Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) acquires Opsware for $1.6 billion

During this period, Loudcloud/Opsware had over 20 direct competitors. Almost all the competitors from the Loudcloud era went bankrupt, including MFN/SiteSmith, Exodus, LogicTier, Williams Communication, Global Crossing, WorldCom/Digex and Storage Networks. Those that survived got bought with valuations of less than $100 million (e.g., Totality) or still have very low valuations (e.g., Navisite).

How did we do it?

“I had a dream I could buy my way to heaven
When I awoke, I spent that on a necklace”

–Kanye West

So how did we navigate through the great dot-com crash, crush the competition, emerge as the No. 1 company in our space and sell the company to HP for $1.6 billion? Did we “cut spending, cut now, and preserve capital?” Did we make cash preservation our No. 1 priority?

No, we didn’t. To underscore the point, here are Loudcloud’s average monthly cash burn figures for the quarters ending in:

• Apr 2001:  $39 million
• Jul 2001:  $35 million
• Oct 2001:  $29 million
• Jan 2002:  $25 million
• Apr 2002:  $22 million
• Jul 2002:  $19.4 million

As you can see, we were aggressively investing in the business throughout 2001 and 2002. While we did reduce our cash burn, we did not make cash preservation our No. 1 priority. As it was, over the course of the transition from Loudcloud to EDS, we sadly laid off 400 employees and transferred another 150 to EDS. However, we didn’t scrimp and save our way to a $1.6 billion acquisition: Instead, it’s what we chose not to cut that ultimately got us there.

Loudcloud was a Web-hosting business. Today, we’d call it a “cloud services” business, but people weren’t quite ready for the “cloud” in 2001. We supercharged our hosting business with software (called Opsware) that automated our Web-hosting operations. The other cloud services businesses of our day also had software investments. However, as the macroeconomic climate changed, they all “cut deep and cut now.” In the end, they ended up putting their software in maintenance mode and stopped building new features.

As we weighed a decision to make the same deep cuts in our own software R&D efforts (a move advocated by the intelligentsia of the day, as well as nearly every MBA we had working in the company), I faced a hard decision: Cut deep and get to cash flow break-even quickly or continue to invest heavily in software?

In the end, I decided to run fat so that we could continue to invest in the Opsware software. At the end of the day, I realized that much larger companies like IBM (IBM) could hire smart people and train them. But without a lasting technology-based advantage, it would be increasingly hard for us to defeat them and build our customer base despite early wins with Ford (F), Fox Sports, and the U.K. government (to name just three of our early customers).

Running fat meant that I laid off zero software engineers so that we could keep on investing in our technology, find our product/market fit, and build a lasting technological advantage.

Still, we had to reduce costs or we would clearly go bankrupt. With this new view of the world, I decided that rather than divesting our intellectual property, I would divest our business. Now, that may sound logical the way I’ve described it, but consider these facts:

• We were generating $65 million/year from the Web-hosting business.
• We were a publicly traded company with a market capitalization of close to $200 million.
• All of our investors (pubic and private) believed in and invested in the Web-hosting business.
• We had close to 500 employees at the time. Nearly all of them were supporting the Web-hosting business.
• We had no other business. We had software, but we did not have a software product and certainly did not have a software business.

Despite all of this, we sold the Loudcloud hosting business to EDS and became Opsware the software company. It was not clear that this was a good idea at the time. In fact, the market thought it was a terrible idea: Our stock promptly lost 80 percent of its value, putting our market cap at about $28 million. It’s worth pointing out that this was about $40 million less than the cash that we had in the bank.

During the transition, we shrank our payroll from 450 employees to fewer than 100. Even with this massive reduction in expenses, it would take another three quarters to reach cash-flow break-even, a milestone we finally reached in Q2 of 2003.

One could argue–and many did–that we should have cut a lot deeper than we did given that we only had one customer. Although EDS was a very large customer (it generated $20 million/year in revenue), a brand new software company doesn’t need 100 people. We could have taken steps to reach cash-flow break-even immediately (clearly, that might have helped us get above 35 cents per share). In other words, we could have “gone lean” by cutting deep, cutting now, and preserving capital.

But rather than do what seemed obvious, I decided to keep on investing. Here’s why: In an economic boom, cash is great, but not necessarily a meaningful competitive advantage. If every company is well funded, being super-well funded doesn’t help you win. In fact, being super-well funded can actually screw you.

But in a bust (like the one we were in), having a lot of cash can be a huge competitive advantage because you can use that cash to put enormous pressure on your underfunded competitors. And that’s what we did.

We spent aggressively to match our best competitor’s product, feature for feature. And we used our public currency to acquire important adjacent functionality (network, process and storage management) that our competitors did not have and couldn’t acquire because they didn’t have the cash (or the equity).

In doing so, we were able to beat a really high-quality start-up (Bladelogic) that did not have the massive technical and cultural baggage that came from exiting the managed services business. Bladelogic was eventually sold to BMC (BMC) for $800 million. But I’m firmly convinced that had we not spent the money, Bladelogic would have emerged as the No. 1 company in the space and gotten the $1.6 billion exit instead of Opsware.

In the end, by continuing to invest aggressively in our technological advantage despite a hellacious funding environment, we were able to turn a doomed business into a winning one.

That is the very short version of how we won the market during the great tech recession of the early 2000s.

So did we learn?

“Hegel was right when he said that we learn from history that man can never learn anything from history.”

–George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)

Every start-up is in a furious race against time. The start-up must find the product-market fit that leads to a great business and substantially take the market before running out of cash. As a result, the top two priorities are always to:

1. Find the product that 1,000 enterprise or 50 million consumers want to buy and grab those customers before your competitors do.
2. Raise enough cash and spend it intelligently so that you don’t go broke along the way.

Clearly, you can’t succeed if you don’t achieve both priority No. 1 and priority No. 2. So why is taking the market more important than not running out of cash? Because the only thing worse for an entrepreneur than start-up hell (bankruptcy) is start-up purgatory.

What is start-up purgatory, you ask? Start-up purgatory occurs when you don’t go bankrupt, but you fail to build the No. 1 product in the space. You have enough money with your conservative burn rate to last for many years. You may even be cash-flow positive. However, you have zero chance of becoming a high-growth company. You have zero chance of being anything but a very small technology business (see Navisite). From the entrepreneur’s point of view, this can be worse than start-up hell since you are stuck with the small company.

You recruited all the employees, you raised all the money and you made all the promises. You either see it through or leave–without your good reputation. No one wants to work for an entrepreneur who quits his or her own company. This is start-up purgatory, where you work just as hard, reap none of the rewards, and watch all your best people leave you. It sucks to be you.

The Bottom Line

Spending a little or spending a lot is a means, not an end. Choose the right strategy to win the market or you may end up going straight to purgatory.

As you listen to the virtues of the lean start-up–lightweight sales, light engineering, and so on–keep the following in mind:

• If you are a high-tech start-up, your value is in your intellectual property. Don’t stare at your spreadsheets so long that you get confused about that.
• You cannot save your way to winning the market.
• The best companies can raise money even in this market. If you are one of those, you should consider raising enough to wipe out your competition.

Thin is in, but sometimes you gotta eat.

Ben Horowitz is co-founder and general partner of Andreessen Horowitz. He co-founded Loudcloud, later renamed Opsware Inc., in 1999 and served as CEO of the company before it was acquired in 2007 by Hewlett-Packard. He was most recently vice president and general manager of Hewlett-Packard’s Business Technology Organization Unit.

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The latest trend in the tech industry–at least among its biggest companies–is to offer products and services that used to be provided by partners. H-P (HPQ) expanded into consulting last year when it bought EDS, Cisco announced in March that it was moving into the server business, in April SAP’s (SAP) software rival Oracle agreed to buy hardware maker Sun Microsystems (JAVA), and in June, Intel (INTC), which makes chips, agreed to buy a software company.

SAP has no such ambition, says Apotheker. Whereas Cisco (CSCO), Oracle (ORCL) et al. say that they can reduce complexity for customers by developing all-in-one products, SAP plans to keep making software and work with partners to achieve the same goal. “People want to reduce complexity, but they don’t want it all to come from one company,” he says.

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Hewlett-Packard’s second-quarter financials may have been in line with forecasts, but they were troubling nonetheless. A number of analysts predicted that the company might report better-than-expected earnings. Sadly, it did not. HP’s net income for the period fell 17 percent to $1.7 billion, or 70 cents per share. Excluding one-time items, the company earned 86 cents a share, compared with a profit of 87 cents a share in the same period last year. The results include charges of 2 cents a share related to a patent dispute. Sales fell three percent to $27.4 billion. Every division of the company, save one, reported a decline in revenue. The lone highlight, Services, posted an increase, but that was due primarily to HP’s acquisition of EDS. The grim details:

Enterprise Storage and Servers: down 28 percent
Software: down 15 percent
Personal Systems Group: down 19 percent (though it claims the leading market position in PCs in every region)
Imaging and Printing Group: down 23 percent
Financial Services: down 6 percent
Services: up 99 percent

Clearly, the decline in consumer and business spending is weighing heavy on HP (HPQ) and will continue to do so. The company expects third-quarter revenue to be approximately flat to down two percent sequentially. And it says full-year revenue will slip approximately four to five percent from the prior-year period.

UPDATE: During a conference call to discuss earnings, HP’s leadership said the company will sack about two percent of the workforce in the months ahead as it looks to trim costs. 6,400 employees will lose their jobs as a result.

Cost-cutting is one of my favorite subjects. We have quite a bit more to do.”

– HP CFO Cathie Lesjak, Sept. 10, 2008

When Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) CFO Cathie Lesjak said she was fond of cost-cutting, she wasn’t kidding. On Monday HP announced plans to cut 24,600 jobs over the next three years as it digests Electronic Data Systems, the technology services giant it acquired for nearly $14 billion this summer. The job cuts amount to about 7.5 percent of the combined company’s total workforce, and most will come from EDS, whose bloated cost structure was in need of a good trim. HP estimates $1.8 billion in annual cost savings once the three-year program is completed. “I think most of you that follow us know I am a big believer that having the most efficient cost structure directly relates to your ability to scale and grow,” HP CEO Mark Hurd explained to securities analysts.

Incidentally, 24,600 sacked employees is a new record for Mark Hurd, whose first big act as HP’s CEO was a restructuring that eliminated some 15,000 jobs.

[Image credit: jischinger]

Thankfully, it wasn’t nearly so rancorous.

Valued at $13.9 billion when it was first announced, the deal will more than double the size of HP’s consulting and outsourcing business. It will likely do the same to the $16.6 billion in revenue from services the company made in 2007.

When the dust has settled around the merger, HP will be the second-largest provider of consulting and outsourcing services, behind IBM (IBM). But it will take some doing to get there. “It’s a very significant combination,” Gartner’s (IT) Ben Pring said when the deal was announced back in May. “[But] people who are skeptical of big integrations will have a field day around this. It’s putting together two large businesses with two different heritages. It’s going to be a big culture clash.”

And if HP manages to pull it off? Well, as Fiorina would likely tell you, bigger is better if you can do it right.

“It’s somewhat amusing because we’ve seen this play before. I think this is sort of further evidence that HP really does see value at scale basically, at size,” Illuminata analyst Gordon Haff said in May. “One of the things we’ve seen very clearly over the last couple years is that Carly really had the right idea, she just couldn’t execute on it. She wasn’t wrong for saying HP needed to be bigger, effectively,” said Haff. “If (the merger) does go through we’re going to end up with an HP that looks a lot like Carly wanted it to look.”

Thankfully, it wasn’t nearly so rancorous.

Valued at $13.9 billion when it was first announced, the deal will more than double the size of HP’s consulting and outsourcing business. It will likely do the same to the $16.6 billion in revenue from services the company made in 2007.

When the dust has settled around the merger, HP will be the second-largest provider of consulting and outsourcing services, behind IBM (IBM). But it will take some doing to get there. “It’s a very significant combination,” Gartner’s (IT) Ben Pring said when the deal was announced back in May. “[But] people who are skeptical of big integrations will have a field day around this. It’s putting together two large businesses with two different heritages. It’s going to be a big culture clash.”

And if HP manages to pull it off? Well, as Fiorina would likely tell you, bigger is better if you can do it right.

“It’s somewhat amusing because we’ve seen this play before. I think this is sort of further evidence that HP really does see value at scale basically, at size,” Illuminata analyst Gordon Haff said in May. “One of the things we’ve seen very clearly over the last couple years is that Carly really had the right idea, she just couldn’t execute on it. She wasn’t wrong for saying HP needed to be bigger, effectively,” said Haff. “If (the merger) does go through we’re going to end up with an HP that looks a lot like Carly wanted it to look.”