“I’m not afraid
To take a stand”
—Eminem

Disclaimer: my business partner, Marc Andreessen, is on the board of directors of Hewlett-Packard (HPQ). I note that I have no inside information, and this blog post is based purely on published material. In 2007, I sold Opsware, the company that I founded and ran to Hewlett-Packard for $1.6B. I worked at Hewlett-Packard from 2007 to 2008 as an executive in the software business.

Recently, my old company Hewlett-Packard has been in the news–and not in a good way. I’ve been watching the coverage from the sidelines up to this point, but felt increasingly compelled to join the conversation and share my point of view. So here goes.

After firing their CEO, Mark Hurd, the HP board has been accused of everything from incompetence to being prudes. The criticism comes from credible, important journalists and bloggers such as Joe Nocera from the New York Times (NYT), prominent economics blogger Felix Salmon, and former GE (GE) CEO Jack Welch. In addition, HP competitor Larry Ellison lambasted the board and even went so far as to hire Mark Hurd to be President of Oracle (ORCL).

So why in the world did the HP board fire such a high performing CEO? Don’t they care about profits and shareholder value? Aren’t those the most important things? Who cares about his personal shenanigans? Did Mark and his marketing contractor even have sex?

While I am pretty sure that there is much more going on behind the scenes than has been broadly reported, as there often is, let’s look at what has been reported:

* Mark Hurd falsified expense reports.

* The false expense reports are related to a contractor named Jodie Fisher, a former softcore porn movie actress and Playboy model with no relevant marketing experience, who HP was paying up to $5,000 per marketing event.

* At the time of his departure from HP, Hurd issued a public statement saying that he’d violated HP’s Standards of Business Conduct:

“As the investigation progressed, I realized there were instances in which I did not live up to the standards and principles of trust, respect and integrity that I have espoused at HP and which have guided me throughout my career. After a number of discussions with members of the board, I will move aside and the board will search for new leadership. This is a painful decision for me to make after five years at HP, but I believe it would be difficult for me to continue as an effective leader at HP and I believe this is the only decision the board and I could make at this time. I want to stress that this in no way reflects on the operating performance or financial integrity of HP.”

Let’s start with the issue of falsifying expense reports. This factor has been largely dismissed in the press with characterizations like this from Joe Nocera of the New York Times:

“When pressed, H.P. said that Mr. Hurd had fudged some expense reports.”

Nocera goes on to argue that there must have been an alternate motivation to dismiss Hurd, because clearly no CEO would be fired simply for “fudging” an expense report.

When I first read of the expense report issue, my reaction was the opposite of Nocera’s. If the Chief Executive Officer of a public company falsifies any official financial statement, he must be fired. In my mind, this is non-negotiable. We are not talking about a low-level employee tossing an extra receipt into his expense report. We are talking about a public company CEO who is paid tens of millions of dollars a year and is responsible for the integrity of the company’s financial statements fraudulently reporting his own expenses. Why is this a problem?

Every person who invests in Hewlett-Packard does so on the basis of HP’s financial statements. Every pension fund, every retiree, every charitable organization, every employee who joins and is compensated via stock options. When they do so, they trust that the statements are true and that the numbers are accurate. The person they trust to ensure accuracy is the CEO.

If the Chief Executive is willing to compromise the integrity of the company’s financials for any reason, then it is impossible to trust any statement. Every day, there are many potential reasons to falsify financial statements. Here are four examples:

* If you miss the quarter, shareholders will lose money.

* If revenues aren’t high enough, you’ll be forced to lay-off hard working, valued employees.

* If you grow slower than a competitor, you may jeopardize your job.

* A shareholder that you’ve been having an illicit affair with doesn’t want the stock price to go down and threatens to tell your wife.

If a CEO is prone to compromise for any reason, he will have every reason. This time it was his expense report. Next time will it be a marginal accrued liability? A deal that came in at 12:01 am on the last day of the quarter? This is a slippery slope that a public board simply cannot tolerate.

What reason was so powerful that it caused Mark Hurd to break his ethical standard, falsify an official financial statement, mislead the board, and ultimately be fired? It seems that this was done to cover up a “close personal relationship” with a woman named Jodie Fisher, who later accused him of sexual harassment, then subsequently withdrew her claim after Hurd personally paid Fisher a large sum of money.

Who is Jodie Fisher? According to press reports, Fisher is a former Playboy model, reality show contestant, and softcore porn movie actress with no work history relevant to her job with HP. She was hired by Hewlett-Packard and paid up to $5,000 per meeting to meet with Fortune 50 CEOs.

The mainstream press has reported these facts as mundane, ordinary, and hardly worth concern. I disagree. HP employs over 300,000 people. Every single one of HP’s employees is keenly interested in the qualities, skill sets, and behaviors that HP values most. Financial compensation and access to the CEO are the most important ways that HP communicates what it values to its employees. Jodie Fisher had more access to the CEO and was paid more than 99.9% of HP’s workforce, despite having no traditional qualifications.

It’s important to note that this was not Hurd paying for his personal extracurricular activity out of his own pocket. This was the Hewlett-Packard Corporation paying a softcore porn movie star with no relevant work experience more than it pays Harvard graduates with 20 years of industry experience. This was the company spitting in the face of the people who worked hard and sacrificed every day to help the company win in the market. It was completely and categorically unacceptable.

Finally, Hurd admitted in a press release to violating the company’s standards of ethics and integrity. So what? Why do companies have standards and ethics anyway? Shouldn’t they just be concerned with profits? Do we want choir boys or shareholder value?

There are many who take the view that business is singular in purpose–to increase shareholder value. They further take the position that constraining that purpose in any way is inefficient and counterproductive. The mainstream press seems to have broadly adopted this position in its attacks on HP. The Wall Street Journal Op Ed page even complained that businesses were being held to an unfair standard when compared to politicians.

I do not subscribe to this view. Running our companies with no moral or ethical standards is bad for society, bad for the country, and ultimately leads to criminal behavior.

Companies should not merely be thought of as money generating machines. Business can represent human society at its best. A business is a group of people working together to deliver value to the world and improve people’s lives. When done ethically, business quite literally changes the world for the better. However, if the dark side of human motivation is not mitigated with standards and ethics, business can destroy.

We saw this unfold at Enron, a company that was, in its time, celebrated for its impressive profits. Underneath the profits was a culture designed from the ground up to completely ignore any ethical standard including a dazzling display of ethically questionable sexual activity among its executives. These activities, such as promoting secretaries to executive positions in exchange for sexual favors, parallel Hurd’s behavior with Jodie Fisher. In Enron’s case, the bad behavior bled over into first line employees who conspired to create blackouts in California in the name of profits and in the absence of ethics. Ultimately, Enron imploded in a swirl of criminal behavior that bankrupted the company, but not before destroying tens of thousands of peoples’ life savings and damaging millions of innocent victims. After the fact, the press bemoaned the culture that lead to the destruction. However, the same reporters instantly forgot the cause as they cavalierly dismissed Hurd’s ethical breach.

In closing, I point out the impressive courage of the HP board of directors to ignore popular opinion and do the right thing. It is not an easy thing to fire a popular, highly successful CEO. It’s even more difficult when you know that you will be roundly criticized for tolerating that same CEO’s failure to develop internal successors. Despite those factors, Hewlett-Packard’s board of directors stood tall and protected the company, its shareholders and all of us from a dark and destructive journey. As a member of the business community and as a citizen, I am extremely proud of and grateful for their actions.

Ben Horowitz is co-founder and general partner of Andreessen Horowitz. He co-founded Loudcloud, later renamed Opsware Inc., in 1999 and served as CEO of the company before it was acquired in 2007 by Hewlett-Packard. He was most recently vice president and general manager of Hewlett-Packard’s Business Technology Organization Unit.

“I mean damn, did you even see the test
You got D’s, motherf*$@%&, D’s! Rosie Perez”
– Kanye West

No position in a company is more important than the CEO, and as a result, no job gets more scrutiny. Sadly, little of this analysis benefits CEOs, as most of the discussions happen behind their backs. This post is a step in the opposite direction. By describing how Andreessen Horowitz evaluates CEOs, I am at the same time describing what I think the job of the CEO is. Here are the key questions we ask:

Does the CEO know what to do?

Can the CEO get the company to do what she knows?

Did the CEO achieve the desired results against an appropriate set of objectives?

1. Does the CEO know what to do?

One should interpret this question as broadly as possible. Does the CEO know what to do in all matters all of the time? This includes matters of personnel, matters of financing, matters of product strategy, matters of goal sizing, matters of marketing. At a macro level, does the CEO set the right strategy for the company and know its implications in every detail of the company?

I evaluate two distinct facets of knowing what to do:

Strategy–At Andreessen Horowitz, we like to say that in good companies, the story and the strategy are the same thing. As a result, the proper output of all the strategic work is the story.

Decision-making–At the detailed level, the output of knowing what to do is the speed and quality of the CEO’s decisions.

The Strategy and the Story

The CEO must set the context that every employee operates within. This context gives meaning to the specific work that people do, aligns interests, enables decision-making and provides motivation. Well-structured goals and objectives contribute to the context, but they do not provide the whole story. More to the point, goals and objectives are not the story. The story of the company goes beyond quarterly or annual goals and gets to the hardcore question of why? Why should I join this company? Why should I be excited to work here? Why should I buy your product? Why should I invest in the company? Why is the world better off as a result of this company’s existence?

When a company clearly articulates its story, the context for everyone–employees, partners, customers, investors, and the press–becomes clear: When a company fails to tell its story, you hear phrases like:

“These reporters don’t get it.”

“Who is responsible for the strategy in this company?”

“We have great technology, but need marketing help.”

The CEO doesn’t have to be the creator of the vision. Nor does she have to be the creator of the story. But she must be the keeper of the vision and the story. As such, the CEO ensures that the company story is clear and compelling.

The story is not the mission statement; the story does not have to be succinct. It is the story. Companies can take as long as they need to tell it, but they must tell it and it must be compelling. A company without a story is a usually a company without a strategy.

Want to see a great company story? Read Jeff Bezos’s three-page letter he wrote to shareholders in 1997. In telling Amazon’s story in this extended from–not as mission statement, not as a tagline–Jeff got all the people who mattered on the same page about what Amazon (AMZN) was about.

Decision-making

Some employees make products, some make sales; the CEO makes decisions. Therefore, a CEO can most accurately be measured by the speed and quality of those decisions. Great decisions come from CEOs who display an elite combination of intelligence, logic, and courage.

Courage is particularly important, because every decision a CEO makes is based on incomplete information. In fact, at the time of the decision, the CEO will generally have less than 10 percent of the information typically present in the ensuing Harvard Business School case study. As a result, the CEO must have the courage to bet the company on a direction even though she does not know if the direction is right. The most difficult decisions (and often the most important) are difficult precisely because they will be deeply unpopular with the CEO’s most important constituencies (employees, investors, and customers).

In my personal experience, the best decision that I made in my career–the decision to sell the Loudcloud business to EDS and become Opsware the software company–would have lost by landslide had I put it to a vote with my employees, my investors or my customers.

As CEO, there is never enough time to gather all information needed to make a decision. The CEO must make hundreds of decisions big and small in the course of a typical week. The CEO cannot simply stop all other activities to gather comprehensive data and do exhaustive analysis to make that single decision. Knowing this, CEOs must be continuously and systematically gathering knowledge in their day-to-day activities so that they will have as much information as possible when the decision point presents itself.

In order to prepare to make any decision, the CEO must systematically acquire the knowledge of everything that might impact any decision that she might make. Questions such as:

What are the competitors likely to do?

What’s possible technically and in what timeframe?

What are the true capabilities of the organization and how can you maximize them?

How much financial risk does this imply?

What will the issues be, given your current product architecture?

Will the employees be energized or despondent about this promotion?

Great CEOs build exceptional strategies for gathering the required information continuously. They embed their quest for intelligence into all of their daily actions from staff meetings to customer meetings to 1:1s. Winning strategies are built on comprehensive knowledge gathered in every interaction the CEO has with an employee, a customer, a partner, an investor, and so on.

2. Can the CEO get the company to do what she knows?

If the CEO paints a compelling vision and makes fast, high-quality decisions, can she then get the company to execute on her vision and decisions? The first ingredient in being able to do this is leadership, as I outlined in a previous post, Notes on Leadership.

In addition, executing well requires a broad set of operational skills. The larger the organization, the more elaborate the requisite skill set.

In order for a company to execute a broad set of decisions and initiatives, it must:

Have the capacity to do so–in other words, the company must contain the necessary talent in the right positions to execute the strategy.

Be a place where every employees can get things accomplished–the employees must be motivated, communication must be strong, the amount of common knowledge must be vast, and the context must be clear.

Is the CEO building a world-class team?

The CEO is responsible for the executive team plus the fundamental interview and hiring processes for all employees. She must make sure that the company sources the best candidates and that the screening processes yield the candidates with the right combination of talent and skills. Ensuring the quality of the team is a core part of running the company. Great CEOs constantly assess whether or not they are building the best team.

The output of this capability is the quality of the team. It’s important to note that team quality is tightly tied to the specific needs of the company in the challenges that it faces at the point in time that it faces them. As a result, it’s quite possible that the executive team changes several times, but the team a) is high-quality the entire way and b) there is no attrition problem.

Is it is easy for employees to contribute to the mission?

The second part of the evaluation determines whether or not the CEO can effectively run the company. To test this, I like to ask this question: “How easy is it for any given individual contributor to get his or her job done?”

In well-run organizations, people can focus on their work (as opposed to politics and bureaucratic procedures) and have confidence that if they get their work done, good things will happen for both the company and them personally. By contrast, in a poor organization, people spend much of their time fighting organizational boundaries and broken processes.

While quite easy to describe, building a well-run organization requires a high level of skill. The skills required range from organizational design to performance management. They involve the incentive structure and the communication architecture that drives and enables every individual employee. When a CEO “fails to scale,” it’s usually along this dimension. In practice, very few CEOs get an “A” on this particular test.

Netflix’s CEO Reed Hastings put great effort into designing a system that enables employees to be maximally effective. His presentation on this design is called Reference Guide on our Freedom and Responsibility Culture. It walks through what Netflix (NFLX) values in its employees, how they screen for those values during the interview process, how they reinforce those values, and how they scale this system as the number of employees grows.

3. Results against objectives

When measuring results against objectives, start by making sure the objectives are correct. CEOs who excel at board management can “succeed” by setting objectives artificially low. Great CEOs who fail to pay attention to board management can “fail” by setting objectives too high. Early in a company’s development, objectives can be particularly misleading as nobody really knows the true size of the opportunity. Therefore, the first task in accurately measuring results is setting objectives correctly.

We also try to keep in mind that the size and nature of the opportunity varies quite a bit across companies. Hoping that VMware (VMW) can be as capital-light as SolarWinds (SWI) or trying to get Yelp to grow as fast as Twitter doesn’t make sense and can be quite destructive. CEOs should be evaluated against their company’s opportunity–not somebody else’s company. Let me share a funny story, which illustrates a CEO really owning delivering against results. This story is from Robin Li, CEO of Baidu (BIDU). He shares that on the day of Baidu’s IPO–usually one of an entrepreneur’s most exhilarating days of his entire life–he sat at his desk terrified. Why? Listen to how Robin owned delivering results:

In 2004, we raised our last round of VC money led by Draper Fisher Jurvetson…and Google, one of our great colleagues. Then a year later, in 2005, the company went public. The ideal price was $27 [the stock's initial offer price] and it closed on the first day at $122. It was great with us for many of the Baidu employees and for all of the Baidu investors. It was a very miserable thing for me because when I decided to take the company public, I was only prepared to deliver financial results that match the price of $27 or maybe a little higher, $30, $40. But I was really shocked to see that the price went to $122 on the first day. So that meant I needed to deliver real results that matches an expectation much, much higher than what I had prepared to do. But in any case, I thought I had no choice. So I put my head down and focused on operation, focused on technology, focused on the user’s experience, and I delivered.

Once we’ve taken all of this into account, we see that black-box results are a lagging indicator. And as they say in the mutual fund prospectuses, “past performance is no guarantee of future performance.” The white box CEO evaluation criteria–“does the CEO know what to do?” and “can the CEO get the company to do it?”–will do a much better job of predicting the future.

Closing Thought

CEO evaluation need not be a byzantine, unstated art. All people, including CEOs, will perform better on a test if they know the questions ahead of time.

Ben Horowitz is co-founder and general partner of Andreessen Horowitz. He co-founded Loudcloud, later renamed Opsware Inc., in 1999 and served as CEO of the company before it was acquired in 2007 by Hewlett-Packard. He was most recently vice president and general manager of Hewlett-Packard’s Business Technology Organization Unit.

The presentation catalyzed a movement. Start-ups everywhere adopted a lean, low-burn, low-investment model. To this day, companies seeking funding at our venture firm, Andreessen Horowitz, proudly proclaim in their pitch decks that they are raising tiny amounts of capital so they can run lean.

On the one hand, it is a fact that capital invested is negatively correlated with returns in the venture capital industry. Pumping too much money into a small start-up is unhealthy for both the company and the investor. On the other hand, Facebook has raised several hundred million dollars and is on track to produce fantastic returns for all of its investors.

So what’s a start-up to do? Much of what has been written and said about lean start-ups makes good sense. However, that advice is often incomplete, and some of the things left unsaid are the least intuitive. In this article, I will articulate some of those things left unsaid in arguing the case for the Fat Start-up.

Here is my central argument. There are only two priorities for a start-up:
Winning the market and not running out of cash. Running lean is not an end. For that matter, neither is running fat. Both are tactics that you use to win the market and not run out of cash before you do so. By making “running lean” an end, you may lose your opportunity to win the market, either because you fail to fund the R&D necessary to find product/market fit or you let a competitor out-execute you in taking the market. Sometimes running fat is the right thing to do.

What the hell do I know?

“Al Pacino couldn’t be no gangsta, DeNiro in ‘Casino’ he no gangsta
Wanna be, wanna see, wan’ get a shovel
dig Tookie up n*&%^!, cause he know gangstas”

–The Game

At this point, some of you are asking yourselves, “What the hell does Ben know? If he were really smart, then he’d know that thin is in.” It turns out that I have some experience in managing a fat start-up through the dot-com implosion of the early 2000s. This chart offers a brief summary of equity market history when I was CEO of Loudcloud and Opsware (click to enlarge):

Note that the Nasdaq index is very highly correlated to the start-up funding environment. During the two years I was CEO of Opsware, the Nasdaq fell 80 percent, far more than it has fallen during the current 2008-10 downturn. So the 2000-02 environment was at least as traumatic as this one for Silicon Valley companies–and arguably much worse.

Here is a brief summary of Loudcloud/Opsware’s fund-raising history during that time:

• September 1999: Loudcloud founded
• November 1999: Loudcloud raises $21 million at a $45 million pre-money valuation (Benchmark Capital is the lead investor)
• January 2000: Loudcloud borrows $45 million from Morgan Stanley (MS)
• June 2000: Loudcloud raises $120M at a $700M pre-money valuation
• March 2001: Loudcloud goes public on Nasdaq, raises $160 million and is valued in the public markets at approximately $480 million. Total funds raised to this point: $346 million.
• August 2002: Loudcloud sells the managed services business to EDS (this was the only actual business we had at the time) for $63.5 million and becomes a software company (and changes its name to Opsware).
• September 2002: Opsware trades for 35 cents per share or approximately a $28 million market cap.
• September 2007: Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) acquires Opsware for $1.6 billion

During this period, Loudcloud/Opsware had over 20 direct competitors. Almost all the competitors from the Loudcloud era went bankrupt, including MFN/SiteSmith, Exodus, LogicTier, Williams Communication, Global Crossing, WorldCom/Digex and Storage Networks. Those that survived got bought with valuations of less than $100 million (e.g., Totality) or still have very low valuations (e.g., Navisite).

How did we do it?

“I had a dream I could buy my way to heaven
When I awoke, I spent that on a necklace”

–Kanye West

So how did we navigate through the great dot-com crash, crush the competition, emerge as the No. 1 company in our space and sell the company to HP for $1.6 billion? Did we “cut spending, cut now, and preserve capital?” Did we make cash preservation our No. 1 priority?

No, we didn’t. To underscore the point, here are Loudcloud’s average monthly cash burn figures for the quarters ending in:

• Apr 2001:  $39 million
• Jul 2001:  $35 million
• Oct 2001:  $29 million
• Jan 2002:  $25 million
• Apr 2002:  $22 million
• Jul 2002:  $19.4 million

As you can see, we were aggressively investing in the business throughout 2001 and 2002. While we did reduce our cash burn, we did not make cash preservation our No. 1 priority. As it was, over the course of the transition from Loudcloud to EDS, we sadly laid off 400 employees and transferred another 150 to EDS. However, we didn’t scrimp and save our way to a $1.6 billion acquisition: Instead, it’s what we chose not to cut that ultimately got us there.

Loudcloud was a Web-hosting business. Today, we’d call it a “cloud services” business, but people weren’t quite ready for the “cloud” in 2001. We supercharged our hosting business with software (called Opsware) that automated our Web-hosting operations. The other cloud services businesses of our day also had software investments. However, as the macroeconomic climate changed, they all “cut deep and cut now.” In the end, they ended up putting their software in maintenance mode and stopped building new features.

As we weighed a decision to make the same deep cuts in our own software R&D efforts (a move advocated by the intelligentsia of the day, as well as nearly every MBA we had working in the company), I faced a hard decision: Cut deep and get to cash flow break-even quickly or continue to invest heavily in software?

In the end, I decided to run fat so that we could continue to invest in the Opsware software. At the end of the day, I realized that much larger companies like IBM (IBM) could hire smart people and train them. But without a lasting technology-based advantage, it would be increasingly hard for us to defeat them and build our customer base despite early wins with Ford (F), Fox Sports, and the U.K. government (to name just three of our early customers).

Running fat meant that I laid off zero software engineers so that we could keep on investing in our technology, find our product/market fit, and build a lasting technological advantage.

Still, we had to reduce costs or we would clearly go bankrupt. With this new view of the world, I decided that rather than divesting our intellectual property, I would divest our business. Now, that may sound logical the way I’ve described it, but consider these facts:

• We were generating $65 million/year from the Web-hosting business.
• We were a publicly traded company with a market capitalization of close to $200 million.
• All of our investors (pubic and private) believed in and invested in the Web-hosting business.
• We had close to 500 employees at the time. Nearly all of them were supporting the Web-hosting business.
• We had no other business. We had software, but we did not have a software product and certainly did not have a software business.

Despite all of this, we sold the Loudcloud hosting business to EDS and became Opsware the software company. It was not clear that this was a good idea at the time. In fact, the market thought it was a terrible idea: Our stock promptly lost 80 percent of its value, putting our market cap at about $28 million. It’s worth pointing out that this was about $40 million less than the cash that we had in the bank.

During the transition, we shrank our payroll from 450 employees to fewer than 100. Even with this massive reduction in expenses, it would take another three quarters to reach cash-flow break-even, a milestone we finally reached in Q2 of 2003.

One could argue–and many did–that we should have cut a lot deeper than we did given that we only had one customer. Although EDS was a very large customer (it generated $20 million/year in revenue), a brand new software company doesn’t need 100 people. We could have taken steps to reach cash-flow break-even immediately (clearly, that might have helped us get above 35 cents per share). In other words, we could have “gone lean” by cutting deep, cutting now, and preserving capital.

But rather than do what seemed obvious, I decided to keep on investing. Here’s why: In an economic boom, cash is great, but not necessarily a meaningful competitive advantage. If every company is well funded, being super-well funded doesn’t help you win. In fact, being super-well funded can actually screw you.

But in a bust (like the one we were in), having a lot of cash can be a huge competitive advantage because you can use that cash to put enormous pressure on your underfunded competitors. And that’s what we did.

We spent aggressively to match our best competitor’s product, feature for feature. And we used our public currency to acquire important adjacent functionality (network, process and storage management) that our competitors did not have and couldn’t acquire because they didn’t have the cash (or the equity).

In doing so, we were able to beat a really high-quality start-up (Bladelogic) that did not have the massive technical and cultural baggage that came from exiting the managed services business. Bladelogic was eventually sold to BMC (BMC) for $800 million. But I’m firmly convinced that had we not spent the money, Bladelogic would have emerged as the No. 1 company in the space and gotten the $1.6 billion exit instead of Opsware.

In the end, by continuing to invest aggressively in our technological advantage despite a hellacious funding environment, we were able to turn a doomed business into a winning one.

That is the very short version of how we won the market during the great tech recession of the early 2000s.

So did we learn?

“Hegel was right when he said that we learn from history that man can never learn anything from history.”

–George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)

Every start-up is in a furious race against time. The start-up must find the product-market fit that leads to a great business and substantially take the market before running out of cash. As a result, the top two priorities are always to:

1. Find the product that 1,000 enterprise or 50 million consumers want to buy and grab those customers before your competitors do.
2. Raise enough cash and spend it intelligently so that you don’t go broke along the way.

Clearly, you can’t succeed if you don’t achieve both priority No. 1 and priority No. 2. So why is taking the market more important than not running out of cash? Because the only thing worse for an entrepreneur than start-up hell (bankruptcy) is start-up purgatory.

What is start-up purgatory, you ask? Start-up purgatory occurs when you don’t go bankrupt, but you fail to build the No. 1 product in the space. You have enough money with your conservative burn rate to last for many years. You may even be cash-flow positive. However, you have zero chance of becoming a high-growth company. You have zero chance of being anything but a very small technology business (see Navisite). From the entrepreneur’s point of view, this can be worse than start-up hell since you are stuck with the small company.

You recruited all the employees, you raised all the money and you made all the promises. You either see it through or leave–without your good reputation. No one wants to work for an entrepreneur who quits his or her own company. This is start-up purgatory, where you work just as hard, reap none of the rewards, and watch all your best people leave you. It sucks to be you.

The Bottom Line

Spending a little or spending a lot is a means, not an end. Choose the right strategy to win the market or you may end up going straight to purgatory.

As you listen to the virtues of the lean start-up–lightweight sales, light engineering, and so on–keep the following in mind:

• If you are a high-tech start-up, your value is in your intellectual property. Don’t stare at your spreadsheets so long that you get confused about that.
• You cannot save your way to winning the market.
• The best companies can raise money even in this market. If you are one of those, you should consider raising enough to wipe out your competition.

Thin is in, but sometimes you gotta eat.

Ben Horowitz is co-founder and general partner of Andreessen Horowitz. He co-founded Loudcloud, later renamed Opsware Inc., in 1999 and served as CEO of the company before it was acquired in 2007 by Hewlett-Packard. He was most recently vice president and general manager of Hewlett-Packard’s Business Technology Organization Unit.

At that price, Andreessen–who owns nearly 6.5 million shares–stands to make $92 million off the deal. Which is a nice bit of validation, given Opsware’s inauspicious beginnings as Loudcloud, a managed hosting company remembered more for a string of heavy losses and a lackluster 2001 IPO.

“Loudcloud took off like a rocketship, raised $350 million in equity and debt financing, went public in March 2001, and was rapidly nearing $100 million in annual recurring managed-services revenue when the entire market blew up and virtually all of our competitors and peers went bankrupt,” Andreessen recalls in a blog post announcing Opsware’s sale to HP. “In September 2002, we did a complete restart as a public company–we sold our managed-services business to EDS and turned Loudcloud into Opsware, a software company based on the core intellectual property developed at Loudcloud. Over the next five years, we executed our original vision–automation of large-scale modern data centers and computer systems. … Today we have announced that Opsware is being acquired by Hewlett-Packard for more than $1.6 billion in cash, or $14.25 per share. For Opsware, this means that our vision will now get delivered at much higher scale–being part of H-P’s software business will ensure that our software will be used by a much larger number of organizations and have an even more dramatic impact on the industry than we would possibly have been able to reach by ourselves over the next several years.”

And for Andreessen, whose first start-up, Netscape Communications Corp., marked the beginning of the Internet boom of the late ’90s, it’s proof that contrary to what F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, there are second acts in some American lives. “One of my favorite facts about this deal,” he wrote, “is that at our acquisition price of $14.25 per share, everyone who bought and held stock in Loudcloud or Opsware in the public market at any time made money.”