Impressive, considering the growth rates of each market. The Mac’s growth in enterprise was three times that of the rest of the market’s 15.7 percent, and in government it was 16 times the market’s 12.1 percent (click images to enlarge).

Could these spikes be an anomaly? Possibly. They are significant and oddly abrupt. Perhaps Apple (AAPL) nailed down a major government contract during the period. That said, quarterly growth of home Mac sales also exceeded those of the rest of the market, 31.4 percent vs. 25.2 percent. Overall, Mac sales grew 31.5 percent year-over-year, well ahead of the 20.9 percent posted by the PC market as a whole.

“Whether the June blip was a one-quarter phenomenon or something more enduring should be revealed in future quarters,” says Wolf. “Notwithstanding its premium prices, the Mac should continue to grow faster than the market thanks to the multiple halo effects that are now driving Mac sales–first the iPod, then the iPhone, and now the iPad.”

Needham & Company analyst Charlie Wolf thinks the latter is more likely. In a lengthy investor note this week, Wolf writes that while Nokia (NOK) may long hold on to its commanding lead in the feature phone market, its fate in the smartphone market is uncertain at best.

Why is that? The company’s Symbian OS is simply far too dusty to stand up to competing operating systems, and that’s having an ugly effect on its share of the smartphone market (click chart to enlarge).

“Nokia’s problem is that the Symbian operating system, the platform on which Nokia phones run, is a generation behind the iPhone and Android smartphone operating systems,” Wolf writes. “With Nokia’s heritage in low cost, volume manufacturing, not software development, it’s unlikely the company will ever catch up with the companies that are redefining this market.”

A reasonable point, given complaints about Symbian 3 failing to match Apple’s (AAPL) iPhone and Google’s (GOOG) Android operating systems. That said, there’s still a chance that the MeeGo OS Nokia has been developing with Intel (INTC) will succeed where Symbian has stumbled. But will it be enough to reinvent the company’s fading smartphone line? Wolf isn’t so sure.

“In our opinion, it’s an open question whether Nokia’s efforts will be successful in meeting the ‘modern’ operating system challenge,” Wolf writes. “Where the company has fallen behind is in building a compelling third-party applications portfolio presumably because its software development tools are difficult to use. As the iPhone has demonstrated, a diverse and deep catalog of applications is becoming an increasingly important consideration in smartphone purchasing decisions.”

But they did work.

Nine years after it was made, Apple’s first uncertain leap into retail has proven a master stroke. Discussing the company’s second quarter earnings on a recent conference call, CFO Peter Oppenheimer noted that revenue from Apple retail stores was $1.68 billion — up from $1.38 billion in the same period last year, and that they sold 606,000 Macs, significantly more than the 438,000 they sold a year earlier.

And half of those were sold were to customers who had never owned a Mac before. Clearly, Apple’s stores have played a pivotal role in attracting new users to the Mac platform — particularly those who use Microsoft (MSFT) Windows. As Needham and Co. analyst Charlie Wolfe noted in a research bulletin to clients this morning, the Apple Store has proven a real magnet for PC-to-Mac switchers.

“Along with the halo effect emanating from the iPod and iPhone, the Apple Stores themselves are playing a pivotal role in attracting Windows users to the Mac platform,” Wolfe wrote. “We estimate that since 2004, over 18 million Windows users have switched to a Mac, equal to over 100 percent of the total size of the Mac platform at the beginning of this period. Reflecting this, Mac sales in the March quarter were almost four times higher than they were in the second quarter of fiscal 2004. Windows switchers, then, have more than doubled the size of the Mac’s installed base. … We estimate that Windows visitors represented well over half of the 170 million visitors to the stores in fiscal 2009.”

A metric worth considering in light of Apple’s big retail plans. The company has said it hopes to add between 40 and 50 new stores to the 286 it already has opened this year alone. Will another big surge in the size of the Mac community follow?

Certainly, Palm’s (PALM) carrier partners haven’t viewed it that way. If they had, Palm wouldn’t be sending hundreds of “Brand Ambassadors” out to Verizon stores in the hopes of juicing sales.

According to Palm CEO Jon Rubinstein, that campaign has met with some success. But it has clearly been hard going against heavily promoted Android devices like the Motorola (MOT) Droid. And it’s only going to get more difficult when Google’s (GOOG) Nexus One smartphone goes live on Verizon (VZ) in the next few months.

So what’s Palm to do? Over at Needham & Company, analyst Charlie Wolf suggests the company redouble its efforts to build out the webOS ecosystem.

“The effort to push the Pre in the carrier channel has not worked because of reluctance of carriers to promote the brand against the Android juggernaut,” Wolf writes. “In our view, then, Palm’s only hope is to adopt a pull strategy; that is, to focus on its software developer program to build a library of compelling applications for the WebOS platform.”

As Wolf sees it, “This effort could prove successful because WebOS’s development tools are already familiar to Web developers; and the developer environment itself is arguably superior to that on Android.”

Worth a shot, right? One of Android’s biggest weaknesses right now is a paucity of good apps. Same thing with Research in Motion’s (RIMM) BlackBerry. If Palm were to drum up some serious developer support and differentiate itself on that level, perhaps it might win a bit more of the market’s attention.

With that and a new gotta-have-it “hero” device, the company might gain at least some of the traction it needs to hold its own in a market that’s being hit with a wave of new Android devices and soon, presumably, a new Apple (AAPL) iPhone as well.

Otherwise, Palm may further languish, or worse. Says Wolf: “Unfortunately, if this [pull] strategy does not work, Palm could be assigned to oblivion.”

With Apple (AAPL) inking multiyear Mac contracts with a number of school districts, it’s growth in edu is on the rebound. And now, with the iPad and its promise of hand-held education just a few weeks from market, Apple could be poised to see significant growth in higher ed.

Obviously, it’s impossible to predict whether the iPad will be the digital device to transform the classroom, but some analysts are enthusiastic about the possibility. Among them: Needham & Company’s Charlie Wolf. Reflecting on Apple’s performance in the U.S education market in a note to clients this morning, he suggests there may be big things ahead for the company.

“The soon-to-be-introduced iPad has the potential to change the buying dynamics in both the secondary and higher education markets,” Wolf writes. “At $500 before typical education discounts, the iPad is price competitive with all the PCs schools now purchase.”

That’s not all. Wolf continues: “And the device has the potential to go much further if, as it appears certain, education content is customized for the iPad to exploit its unique multimedia capabilities. It is not difficult to imagine classrooms where the iPad takes center stage, capturing a significant percentage of the school market in the process.”

Not difficult to imagine at all, though it may take some time to get there. As my colleague, Peter Kafka, reminds me, the iPad-as-textbook is likely quite a way off given that it requires buy-in from educational publishers, not to mention school boards and academia. Beyond that, there’s the need for applications that really take advantage of the portability and breadth of use that the iPad offers and to position it as a true an educational tool.

“To be successful in the secondary ed market, the iPad will need content and application developers to write applications that exploit the unique form factor and features of the iPad–content and apps that materially improve the ‘educational experience’ in the classroom,” Wolf told me in a brief email interview this morning. 

“If that doesn’t happen,” Wolf added, the iPad could enjoy some success. But it would be far less than that which would occur if the iPad becomes a unique educational tool.”

Wolf believes higher ed will be easier, though. “Again it will depend on content developers–the publishers–exploiting the dynamic features of the device to enhance the educational experience,” he said. ”Simply formatting text books for the iPad will be OK, but it would eliminate any chance of a hockey stick of adoption.”

[Image credits: Needham & Company, Adam Tow]

It remains to be seen whether Apple (AAPL) has created an entirely new computing category with the iPad. But at the very least, analysts seem to believe the company has created an enduring growth engine.

• Charlie Wolf, Needham & Company
  “Because Apple is defining a new category of devices, sales of the iPad are likely to ramp slowly. But the $500 starting price point is low enough to attract a sizable portion of the early adopter crowd, consisting of iPhone and iPod owners. It’s noteworthy that the iPad’s initial price is below the iPhone’s initial price and not much higher than the price of the first iPod, introduced in 2001. Our best guess at this time is the Apple could sell four million iPads in its initial year on the market, which translates into at least $2 billion of revenue.”
• Gene Munster, Piper Jaffray
  “Originally we were estimating sales of 2m units in the first calendar year at a price point of $600-$800. With the actual $499/$629 price point, we believe Apple will sell 3m-4m units in the first 12 months….After using the iPad, we believe it will cannibalize iPod touch sales, but not Mac sales. The gadget is a premium mobile device, not a computer; as such, we see some iPod touch buyers stepping up to the iPad, but consumers looking for an affordable portable computer will likely stick with the MacBook lineup.”
• James McQuivey, Forrester
  “The iPad is a grown up iPod Touch. Apple has taken the safe route of offering its existing customers an option that goes beyond today’s iPod Touch in size and capability, but it has not offered a new category of devices that tackles the 5-6 hours of media we each consume every day. With no integrated social media for sharing photos, recommending books, and sharing home video, the iPad misses a big piece of what makes media so powerful. As it stands, by relying on the App Store as the single most important draw of the device besides its attractiveness, the iPod Touch is a significant step toward making tablets respectable. But making tablets respectable should have been the least of Apple’s ambitions. It had (and still has) the opportunity to create a new media experience in consumers’ lives. As it stands, a quick, well-structured response from Amazon in the next version of Kindle could easily be a contender here. That’s why I say that the iPad is priced lower than expected because it is less revolutionary than expected.”
• Mike Abramsky, RBC
  “Like the first iPod and iPhone, uptake may in time surprise as future versions improve and costs decline. The iPad’s intuitiveness and simplicity at key tasks (browsing, email, media, watching videos, games, reading, working) may appeal to consumers for whom existing PC experiences are intimidating, inadequate, delivering 90%+ of the features of traditional PCs with less complexity than traditional PCs. Uptake however may require in-store demos to truly experience the richness of iPad’s experience.”
• Tavis McCourt, Morgan Keegan
  “The iPad has been long anticipated so we are not shocked by the lack of stock movement. Given the price point, we suspect initial sales will be strong (this is Apple, and there are many enthusiasts), and then simmer down a bit after a few months. The ultimate success of a new product category will be the unique apps developed for this device, and with the SDK just going out today, it is hard to know how impressive they will be. However, the good news is that aside from maybe modest iPod Touch cannibalization, we doubt that the iPad will cannibalize any revenues from the massive margin pools within the iPhone and Mac product categories.”
• Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research
  “Longer term, the iPad offers the potential to redefine the boundaries between print and video, turning formerly passive media into active ones, and in the process making what are currently low bandwidth applications (say, reading a newspaper) become much more bandwidth intensive (e.g. by embedding video rather than still pictures).”
• Mark Moskowitz, J.P. Morgan
  “iPad is not for everyone, and the first-generation product is sure to have its critics given the prelaunch buzz. In our view, the iPad is a smart, nimble device for heavy content users–Apple’s core customer. iPad is a hybrid of sorts, marrying select benefits of the smartphone and notebook. We expect the market to be small at first, but the gamer and education verticals should construct a meaningful growth ramp longer term.”

“There’s room for three to five players in this space. We don’t have to beat each other to prosper.”

– Palm CEO Jon Rubinstein

Palm CEO Jon Rubinstein likes to say smart-phone makers “don’t have to beat each other to prosper,” but it’s beginning to look like they–or, rather, Palm–might have to. Because while the Pre may have put Palm (PALM) back in the game, it’s not clear how long it can keep it there. With competition in the emerging smart-phone market ratcheting up as we head into the holidays, some analysts are predicting that Palm’s quarterly sales may decline–sharply.

“[Palm’s] guidance of a sequential decline in revenues in the second quarter implies that Pre sales are not off to the races,” Needham & Co. analyst Charlie Wolf wrote in a research note today. “Although Palm did not say what Pre sales were in the quarter, they appear to have been around 600,000 units, about 100,000 above our estimate. Palm indicated that revenues could fall to $240 million to $270 million in the second quarter, a number that implies that Pre sales could fall to 500,000 units vs. our previous estimate of 750,000 units.”

Interesting that Wolf pegs Pre sales as being above his estimate, since Palm hasn’t yet broken that number out. Indeed, in a conference call with analysts yesterday the company was so quick to dodge questions about Pre sales that I assumed it’s not an impressive number. But if the company really did ship 600,000 units as Wolf contends, that would suggest it’s doing pretty well at market, though certainly not as well as the Apple (AAPL) iPhone or Research in Motion’s (RIMM) BlackBerry. Odd then, that Palm wouldn’t disclose a hard sales number.

“The Pre and its siblings running on Palm’s WebOS software platform appear to be a serious contender in the smartphone market,” Wolf concludes. “But it would be premature at this point to declare it a winner in view of the fact that the smartphone market will shortly be overrun with new phones from Motorola and others running on the Android platform as well as new BlackBerry models in time for the holiday selling season.”

Sure, there might be room for three to five players in the smart-phone space, as Rubinstein claims. But that space is currently occupied at least seven players–Apple, RIM, Nokia (NOK), Motorola (MOT), Samsung, Sony Ericsson and Palm. Which means somebody’s got to go. So while Palm might not have to beat anyone to prosper, it may have to, to survive.

“The sole driver of the increase in Apple’s price target is a higher valuation of the iPhone,” Wolf wrote. “Courtesy of network effects, the explosive growth of the iTunes App Store…should translate into a higher growth trajectory of iPhone sales going forward….By exploiting a commanding lead in the all-important smartphone applications market, the iPhone is in a position to chalk up share gains in this fast-growing market that could surprise everyone….In many respects, Apple and Amazon are in similar positions. Amazon holds a relatively small but growing share of the e-commerce market, which itself is small, but growing an order of magnitude faster than the physical retail market.”

Wolf admits that his latest forecast is “judgmental” in that it’s based on the premise that software, namely iPhone applications, will drive hardware, namely iPhone sales. But he explains that the premise does have a proven track record in markets characterized by increasing returns and network effects.

“We have upped the number of iPhones that will be sold in 2018, the final year in our model, from 67 million to 107 million,” Wolf added. “Our forecast has the phone capturing 20 percent share of the smartphone market in that year, up from 12.5 percent recently. We should note that the iPhone’s share of the worldwide market is already around 12.5 percent. So our forecast is by no means an aggressive one.”

No doubt about it, it’s a good time to be an Apple investor.

Seems the Street would have much preferred the “boatloads of money” Yahoo CEO Carol Bartz once said she’d demand for a search deal, than the “boatloads of value” she claims to have given them this morning. As I write this, Yahoo (YHOO) shares are trading down more than 12 percent at $15.14. Microsoft (MSFT) shares are up 1.41 percent at $23.80.

Below, a roundup of analyst notes that have been issued on the deal.

Jeff Lindsay, Bernstein Research: We believe Yahoo!’s search deal represents a significant positive for the company’s economics, as both Yahoo! and MSFT were too subscale to compete effectively versus Google. Although the combined 30% search share is still less than half the size of Google, both Yahoo! and MSFT will realize significant cost savings from combining their search technologies. In addition, the greater scale should increase the effectiveness of the search engine, driving revenue synergies through improved search monetization.

Sarah Friar, Goldman Sachs: We view the deal as positive for Microsoft as terms are better for the company than had been speculated (no upfront fee; 88% TAC) and the combined market share provides scale to drive efficiency and legitimacy/relevancy for Microsoft’s online investments. Yahoo!’s $3.0 bn/year search sales translates to $360 mn/year for Microsoft in revenues. Microsoft will incur incremental expenses when the deal closes (expected early CY10), but limited (if any) impact on FY10E and while investments will continue into FY11, our model already assumes sizable expenses.

Douglas Anmuth, Barclays: YHOO-MSFT terms not nearly as favorable as anticipated, but we believe deal is neutral to the co’s L-T positioning. We would have liked to have seen an upfront payment, higher TAC, & rev share on Bing.com searches among other things, but we like that YHOO maintains ability to sell search adv, & therefore relationship with its largest advertisers. It’s unclear how favorable the deal will be to YHOO over time, but our fundamental reasons for owning shares remain the same. We expect better execution on the audience & content biz & specifically within display adv., & we believe YHOO will be able to take out a meaningful amount of costs from the biz aside from search tech. over the next couple yrs.

Peter Misek, Cannacord Adams: We are relieved that Microsoft did not have to provide an upfront payment as part of this deal while effectively garnering more scale. This deal provides Microsoft with a much needed boost in competing with Google (GOOG : NASDAQ : US$435.00 | BUY) as its search algorithm, Bing, is being catapulted to greater market share. In addition, utilizing Yahoo!’s sales force for premium search will allow Microsoft to lower expenses over the duration of the partnership while attempting to attract a greater level of advertisers for the combined platforms. We believe this is a much needed relief for Microsoft, but is one step in a greater battle. In the end this doesn not solve Microsoft’s competitive disadvantage with Google. Rather we think it accelerates Microsoft’s desire to think outside the box and come up with a non-linear way to catch Google.

Heath Terry and Andrew Thomas, FBR Capital Markets: The lack of an up-front payment, no minimum revenue guarantee, and a revenue share that, while above average, is slightly below the +90% that larger deals command make for a lackluster deal for Yahoo!, in our opinion. The lack of any display component to the deal also seems like a missed opportunity for the company. As we see it, the only financial benefit to Yahoo! is the ability to shed the not insignificant technology costs associated with running a search engine. According to the company, this should result in an annual benefit to GAAP operating income of $500M….Restructuring these two businesses and untangling them from their existing partnerships and internal ties will be a massive organizational challenge for both companies.

Mark Mahaney, Citi Investment Research: Implications For YHOO – Positives: 1) YHOO believes deal would generate incremental $250MM in annual cash flow (17% accretive to our ’09 est)–assumptions very hard to test, but magnitude is reasonably conservative; 2) 88% TAC is higher than industry average, but as expected given deal size. Challenges: 1) No upfront payment to YHOO is a negative vs. expectations, tho guaranteed RPS provides significant backstop; 2) Lack of display advertising deal is a negative vs. expectations; & 3) Acknowledgment of YHOO’s Search technology limitations.

Todd Greenwald, Signal Hill Capital Group: The deal announced today will take a very long time to come to fruition we think, and will face several challenges–it will face regulatory hurdles given Microsoft’s antitrust history (though we’d expect it to ultimately get through given Google’s dominance). Additionally, it seems hard to fathom operationally, as it will require Yahoo’s salespeople to be selling Microsoft’s technology. Advertisers will want one point of contact (which would be Yahoo), though that point of contact won’t be entirely responsible for what they are selling–instead of bringing in an engineer from within the same building, the Yahoo salesperson may have to coordinate with a Microsoft employee up in Redmond. Not impossible, just tricky. And considering how smooth and automated the process of buying ads is on Google’s platform, this could prove to be a competitive disadvantage.

Mark May, Needham & Company: Search advertising is not a zero sum game, in our opinion. If Microsoft is able to make Yahoo! (and Microsoft) search more effective through this deal/combination, then we believe is will result in advertising spending more on the new search platform but not less on the Google platform. A more effect Yahoo!/Microsoft search platform does not mean Google search becomes less effective, and we believe there is more demand than supply for effective search marketing. The dollars will likely come from other, less effective, buckets.

Business 101 convincingly argues that most large M&A deals and partnerships are not successful. And, most large-scale Internet media M&A deals and partnerships have tended to under-perform their original promise (e.g., AOL Time Warner, Google/MySpace, etc.). Moreover, in the case of Yahoo!/Microsoft Search, you have two very different cultures and an expected 24 month transition process. The odds are stacked against this deal having a meaningfully impact on Google. And, over the next 2+ years while Yahoo! and Microsoft are trying to transition, Google will be innovating.

Seems the Street would have much preferred the “boatloads of money” Yahoo CEO Carol Bartz once said she’d demand for a search deal, than the “boatloads of value” she claims to have given them this morning. As I write this, Yahoo (YHOO) shares are trading down more than 12 percent at $15.14. Microsoft (MSFT) shares are up 1.41 percent at $23.80.

Below, a roundup of analyst notes that have been issued on the deal.

Jeff Lindsay, Bernstein Research: We believe Yahoo!’s search deal represents a significant positive for the company’s economics, as both Yahoo! and MSFT were too subscale to compete effectively versus Google. Although the combined 30% search share is still less than half the size of Google, both Yahoo! and MSFT will realize significant cost savings from combining their search technologies. In addition, the greater scale should increase the effectiveness of the search engine, driving revenue synergies through improved search monetization.

Sarah Friar, Goldman Sachs: We view the deal as positive for Microsoft as terms are better for the company than had been speculated (no upfront fee; 88% TAC) and the combined market share provides scale to drive efficiency and legitimacy/relevancy for Microsoft’s online investments. Yahoo!’s $3.0 bn/year search sales translates to $360 mn/year for Microsoft in revenues. Microsoft will incur incremental expenses when the deal closes (expected early CY10), but limited (if any) impact on FY10E and while investments will continue into FY11, our model already assumes sizable expenses.

Douglas Anmuth, Barclays: YHOO-MSFT terms not nearly as favorable as anticipated, but we believe deal is neutral to the co’s L-T positioning. We would have liked to have seen an upfront payment, higher TAC, & rev share on Bing.com searches among other things, but we like that YHOO maintains ability to sell search adv, & therefore relationship with its largest advertisers. It’s unclear how favorable the deal will be to YHOO over time, but our fundamental reasons for owning shares remain the same. We expect better execution on the audience & content biz & specifically within display adv., & we believe YHOO will be able to take out a meaningful amount of costs from the biz aside from search tech. over the next couple yrs.

Peter Misek, Cannacord Adams: We are relieved that Microsoft did not have to provide an upfront payment as part of this deal while effectively garnering more scale. This deal provides Microsoft with a much needed boost in competing with Google (GOOG : NASDAQ : US$435.00 | BUY) as its search algorithm, Bing, is being catapulted to greater market share. In addition, utilizing Yahoo!’s sales force for premium search will allow Microsoft to lower expenses over the duration of the partnership while attempting to attract a greater level of advertisers for the combined platforms. We believe this is a much needed relief for Microsoft, but is one step in a greater battle. In the end this doesn not solve Microsoft’s competitive disadvantage with Google. Rather we think it accelerates Microsoft’s desire to think outside the box and come up with a non-linear way to catch Google.

Heath Terry and Andrew Thomas, FBR Capital Markets: The lack of an up-front payment, no minimum revenue guarantee, and a revenue share that, while above average, is slightly below the +90% that larger deals command make for a lackluster deal for Yahoo!, in our opinion. The lack of any display component to the deal also seems like a missed opportunity for the company. As we see it, the only financial benefit to Yahoo! is the ability to shed the not insignificant technology costs associated with running a search engine. According to the company, this should result in an annual benefit to GAAP operating income of $500M….Restructuring these two businesses and untangling them from their existing partnerships and internal ties will be a massive organizational challenge for both companies.

Mark Mahaney, Citi Investment Research: Implications For YHOO – Positives: 1) YHOO believes deal would generate incremental $250MM in annual cash flow (17% accretive to our ’09 est)–assumptions very hard to test, but magnitude is reasonably conservative; 2) 88% TAC is higher than industry average, but as expected given deal size. Challenges: 1) No upfront payment to YHOO is a negative vs. expectations, tho guaranteed RPS provides significant backstop; 2) Lack of display advertising deal is a negative vs. expectations; & 3) Acknowledgment of YHOO’s Search technology limitations.

Todd Greenwald, Signal Hill Capital Group: The deal announced today will take a very long time to come to fruition we think, and will face several challenges–it will face regulatory hurdles given Microsoft’s antitrust history (though we’d expect it to ultimately get through given Google’s dominance). Additionally, it seems hard to fathom operationally, as it will require Yahoo’s salespeople to be selling Microsoft’s technology. Advertisers will want one point of contact (which would be Yahoo), though that point of contact won’t be entirely responsible for what they are selling–instead of bringing in an engineer from within the same building, the Yahoo salesperson may have to coordinate with a Microsoft employee up in Redmond. Not impossible, just tricky. And considering how smooth and automated the process of buying ads is on Google’s platform, this could prove to be a competitive disadvantage.

Mark May, Needham & Company: Search advertising is not a zero sum game, in our opinion. If Microsoft is able to make Yahoo! (and Microsoft) search more effective through this deal/combination, then we believe is will result in advertising spending more on the new search platform but not less on the Google platform. A more effect Yahoo!/Microsoft search platform does not mean Google search becomes less effective, and we believe there is more demand than supply for effective search marketing. The dollars will likely come from other, less effective, buckets.

Business 101 convincingly argues that most large M&A deals and partnerships are not successful. And, most large-scale Internet media M&A deals and partnerships have tended to under-perform their original promise (e.g., AOL Time Warner, Google/MySpace, etc.). Moreover, in the case of Yahoo!/Microsoft Search, you have two very different cultures and an expected 24 month transition process. The odds are stacked against this deal having a meaningfully impact on Google. And, over the next 2+ years while Yahoo! and Microsoft are trying to transition, Google will be innovating.

Apparently, investors aren’t too keen on the deal. Why? A number of reasons, according to Needham & Company analyst Mark May. “While the details of the deal can confuse the risks and benefits to Yahoo!, this deal ultimately means that Yahoo! is outsourcing search to Microsoft,” May told Digital Daily. “If you you’re bullish on search, and on the power of having combined strength in both search and display, I think you’d have to view this deal as negative for Yahoo! and positive for Microsoft.” May noted that there are a number of reasons for Yahoo investors to look askance at this deal. Among them:

• There’s no upfront payment.
• The deal requires regulatory approval and isn’t expected to close until 2010.
• The companies don’t expect to see the full benefits of the deal until 24 months after regulatory approval.
• While the companies claim Yahoo “will become the exclusive worldwide relationship sales force for both companies’ premium search advertisers,” most of the value is and will be derived via the self-service channel–which Microsoft will now control.
• The deal could put Yahoo!’s affiliate/syndicated search business at risk.
• The deal’s 10-year length may put Yahoo at Microsoft’s mercy given that there’s only one other supplier–Google (GOOG).

Complete Coverage

• WWGD: What Will Google Do, Now That There Is Finally a MicroHoo?
• Liveblogging the Yahoo-Microsoft Search Deal Conference Call: The Carol and Steve Show Debuts!
• Yahoo Investors on Microsoft Deal: Do Not Want
• Yahoo CEO Carol Bartz’s Letter About the YaSoft Deal
• MicroHoo Deal Finally Official in a 10-Year Landmark Partnership (Plus the Full Press Release)
• Yahoo To Get 110 Percent of Search Revenue in First Two Years of Deal With Microsoft
• Before Yahoo-Microsoft Deal Terms Are Unveiled, Let’s Go to the Videotape From the Last One
• Microsoft-Yahoo Deal Struck–Will Be Announced Within Next 24 Hours

Shares in the company slid still deeper into the mud today as the market reflected on the uneventful conclusion of the company’s merger talks with Microsoft (MSFT) and its decision to–well, let’s face it–become a reseller of Google (GOOG) ads. In early trading, Yahoo’s stock, which plummeted 10% in late trading yesterday, fell another 6% to around $22. And it’s likely to fall further still, with financial analysts taking swings at it like kids at a piñata.

“This deal diminishes Yahoo’s relevance among advertisers and strengthens the hand of a key competitor,” analyst Mark May of Needham & Company told clients in a research note today.

And over at Cantor Fitzgerald, analyst Derek Brown agreed. “We remain concerned about the long-term implications of this deal for Yahoo,” he said. “While the company should reap a near-term financial windfall with Google by its side, it seems to be sacrificing its vision of becoming a ‘must buy’ for online advertisers. After all, doesn’t this deal make Google, not Yahoo!, the ‘must buy’ for online advertisers?”

Jeffrey Lindsay of Bernstein Research says the deal is a litigation nightmare waiting to happen. “We think at a minimum that the current deal will result in further lawsuits, which Yahoo will ultimately have to settle, further impacting the economics of the deal,” he said.

And analyst Laura Martin of Soleil Securities Group says it’s just a nightmare, plain and simple. “Execution issues become more challenging as talent continues to stream out the door,” Martin said in a research note. “With the collapse of the Microsoft deal, Yahoo employees lost (in addition to shareholders), and we expect Yahoo’s employee turnover to accelerate as its share price falls and their stock options are way underwater. Shareholder litigation may distract the board and senior management and will cost Yahoo shareholders more money.”

And Shar VanBoskirk, an analyst with Forrester Research (FORR), well, she reacted as I imagine many observers did–with a slow shake of the head. “It’s a great deal for Google,” she told BusinessWeek . “I have no idea what Yahoo’s thinking.”

If it was thinking at all … Said Mark May, an analyst at Needham & Co., “This just reaffirms the view that Yahoo, and particularly Jerry Yang and David Filo, blew it. It’s hard to see how this management team is going to be able to extract or create value anywhere near 33 bucks a share anytime soon.”