“The cost of smart phones is considerably higher than feature phones for which the early termination fees were created years ago at $175,” said Verizon spokesman Jim Gerace. He added that the new $350 ETF declines by $10 per month through the life of the contract and customers can avoid it by buying their devices off contract and paying full retail price.

An interesting move for Verizon (VZ), which just last year agreed to pay $21 million to settle a class-action lawsuit filed by California consumers over the very early-termination fees it is now increasing. The plaintiffs in the suit alleged that Verizon’s ETFs were illegal under California law and that they were designed to unfairly lock consumers into long-term contracts and prevent them from switching carriers. When Verizon settled the suit, it denied any wrongdoing, insisting that early-termination fees are simply a means of recovering legitimate costs. And to some extent Verizon does have a point.

Full retail price for the Motorola’s (MOT) new Droid is $559.99. With a two-year contract, Verizon sells the handset for $199.99. Theoretically, that’s a $359.99 subsidy (I have no idea at what price Verizon purchases Droid from Motorola). So if Verizon allowed subscribers to break their contract after a month without paying an early-termination fee, the company would stand to lose money. And subscribers who did so could subsequently sell the device online and potentially make a profit, though a small one.

So it’s certainly understandable that Verizon and other carriers want to protect the subsidies they dole out for these new smart phones. And as noted earlier, Verizon’s new ETF drops by $10 each month a subscriber remains under contract. But at this rate, subscribers are still bound to pay a $110 termination fee in the 23rd month of a two-year contract. The contract is nearly over, the subscriber obligation to Verizon almost fulfilled, yet the company can still slap its customers with nearly a third of the full ETF if they break it at that time.

By month 23 of a two-year contract, does Verizon really stand to lose $110 if subscribers decide to switch carriers? Doesn’t seem likely if subscribers can walk away just a month later without consequence, taking their handsets with them.

Since Verizon is pro-rating the ETF, why isn’t it doing so in such a way that it zeroes out by the end of the contract?

And isn’t the fast pace of innovation in the smart-phone sector such that prices–for both component and device–are dropping so quickly that high ETFs aren’t really justified? Remember, you can get Apple’s (AAPL) iPhone for $99 today. When the iPhone debuted in 2007, it commanded a price of $499/$599, depending on model.

I’ve put those same questions to Verizon and will update here when I hear back. In the meantime, here’s what Consumers Union policy analyst Joel Kelsey has to say on the matter: “When people want to switch wireless services, the biggest cost they face is early termination fees. These fees are designed to lock people into long-term contracts and stop them from getting better deals. Early-termination fees make the marketplace less competitive. Verizon’s move is painful proof that it’s time for lawmakers to crack down on these fees.”

UPDATE: Verizon Wireless spokesperson Nancy Stark offers the following answers to the questions I posed above:

Your first question regarding the balance at month 23 or 24 assumes that, at that point, we have recovered all of our subsidy and up-front costs for every device. That simply is not so.

On your second question, while the pace of innovation plays a role in prices coming down somewhat, it also plays a role in driving up costs as more and more complexity that customers want is added to phones–from premium HTML browsers to high-resolution MP cameras with optical zoom; videoplayers; music players; dual processor chipsets; WiFi; very high display resolution, operating systems such as BlackBerry, Windows Mobile, Palm, Android–ALL with the added value (vs a desktop) of mobility, and ALL in one tiny device that ALSO allows you to talk to anyone from anywhere. phew! (by comparison, I recently paid $200 for a camera and all it can do is take pictures, and it has only middle of the road capabilities.)

But getting back to ETFs specifically. The most important point is that Verizon Wireless customers do not have to have an ETF at all if they do not want to. ETFs allow customers to have it either way: They can have no ETF and pay full retail for their device. OR, they can get a greatly discounted device by having an ETF.

Joost and Joltid filed a motion for preliminary injunction against former Joost CEO Michelangelo Volpi and Index Ventures, where Volpi now works as a partner, asking that he not use knowledge or confidential information he got at the video start-up in current dealings with Skype.

The move is yet another legal attack from the founders of Skype, who were on the losing side of the $2 billion deal to buy the Internet telephony giant from eBay (EBAY).

Opening the “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,” which is shown below and is full of tough allegations about Volpi’s misbehavior:

“This action arises out of the acts of a faithless fiduciary, defendant Michelangelo Volpi, who, despite being the chief executive and Chairman of Joost, embarked on a systematic scheme to breach his fiduciary duties and promote his own self-aggrandizing campaign to become the next chairman of internet telephony leader Skype Inc.”

Volpi, who declined comment for now, was CEO of Joost, arriving at the much-hyped online video start-up to great fanfare in mid-2007.

But the London-based Joost never quite caught fire and began layoffs and contraction this summer.

As part of that development, Volpi then went to Index Ventures, a venture firm also based in London.

And, in one of Volpi’s first deals, Index was one of the smaller players on the winning side of the bid to buy Skype, putting up $75 million.

But also vying for the prize were the Internet telephony service’s founders, Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis, who had hooked up with a group of private equity investors.

To complicate things further, the innovative and entrepreneurial pair also own a company called Joltid, which has licensed key technology for Skype to eBay.

Joltid and eBay have been fighting in court over that agreement, bickering back and forth about whether eBay violated the terms of that deal or not.

Via Joltid, Zennström and Friis also filed suit again against Skype and its owner, eBay, for copyright violations in the U.S.

For good measure, they also added the winning buyout group, including Index, Silver Lake Partners, Andreessen Horowitz and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board.

And both Joltid and Joost–aka Zennström and Friis–also sued Volpi personally, as well as Index again.

They allege tech skullduggery on Volpi’s part, in which he used confidential information he learned at Joost to thwart Joltid.

UPDATE: Here is the press release, with the official filing below:

Joost and Joltid File Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Michelangelo Volpi

And Index Ventures Management, Seeking to Prevent Their Use of Confidential Information In Connection With the Acquisition or Management of Skype

Wilmington, DE (Oct. 14, 2009)–Joost US, Inc., its indirect parent company Joost N.V., and Joltid Limited today filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Michelangelo Volpi and Index Ventures Management in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. In support of the Motion, the plaintiffs also filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities containing facts and legal arguments, witness declarations and other evidence.

The Motion for Preliminary Injunction asks the Court to enjoin Index and Volpi from using any of Joost’s and Joltid’s confidential information regarding (among other things) the Global Index Software, the technology developed and owned by Joltid that provides the peer-to-peer capability embedded in the Skype program. The Motion also asks the Court to enjoin the defendants from: (i) using the confidential information in connection with the operation or strategic planning of Skype; (ii) communicating such information to other parties in the “Buyout Group” that has made a bid to acquire Skype from eBay Inc.; (iii) soliciting employees of Joost and Joltid with offers to join Skype; (iv) having communications with current or former employees of Joost or Joltid regarding the companies’ confidential information; and (v) further participating in the Skype acquisition or assuming any position with Skype until a final adjudication of the merits of the case.

The Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and supporting declarations are available on the internet at https://www.lexisnexis.com/fileandserve. The case name is Joost US Inc. et al v. Volpi et al and the Case Number is 1:09-cv-708.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants on September 18, 2009, alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Volpi, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Index, interference with prospective business advantage, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract against Index, breach of confidence, and civil conspiracy. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks interim relief until the lawsuit can be completed.

And here is the key filing, one of 10 in the case:

PI Brief – PUBLIC –

Sources briefed on the matter say DOJ attorneys have contacted Google (GOOG) as well as the Association of American Publishers and the Authors Guild about the antitrust implications of the agreement. Presumably at issue here are concerns over the settlement’s opt-out terms–authors and publishers who don’t opt out have effectively opted in–and the fate of orphan works, books still in copyright but whose copyright owners are unknown.

Orphan works number in the millions and the fear is that this settlement gives Google a powerful blanket license for them. As Pamela Samuelson, director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, recently noted:

An estimated 70 per cent of the books in the Book Search repository are in-copyright, but out of print. Most of them are, for all practical purposes, “orphan works,” that is, works for which it is virtually impossible to locate the appropriate rights holders to ask for permission to digitize them….The proposed settlement agreement would give Google a monopoly on the largest digital library of books in the world….Google will also be the only service lawfully able to sell orphan books and monetize them through subscriptions….Virtually the only way that Amazon.com, Microsoft, Yahoo!, or the Open Content Alliance could get a comparably broad license as the settlement would give Google would be by starting its own project to scan books. The scanner might then be sued for copyright infringement, as Google was. It would be very costly and very risky to litigate a fair use claim to final judgment given how high copyright damages can be (up to $150,000 per infringed work). Chances are also slim that the plaintiffs in such a lawsuit would be willing or able to settle on equivalent or even similar terms.

Samuelson concludes that the Book Search agreement as written is essentially a major restructuring of the book industry and an anticompetitive one at that. If that is indeed the case–and Google maintains that it is not–it’s worrisome indeed. Certainly, it’s reason enough for the DOJ to give the agreement a good once-over.

Sources briefed on the matter say DOJ attorneys have contacted Google (GOOG) as well as the Association of American Publishers and the Authors Guild about the antitrust implications of the agreement. Presumably at issue here are concerns over the settlement’s opt-out terms–authors and publishers who don’t opt out have effectively opted in–and the fate of orphan works, books still in copyright but whose copyright owners are unknown.

Orphan works number in the millions and the fear is that this settlement gives Google a powerful blanket license for them. As Pamela Samuelson, director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, recently noted:

An estimated 70 per cent of the books in the Book Search repository are in-copyright, but out of print. Most of them are, for all practical purposes, “orphan works,” that is, works for which it is virtually impossible to locate the appropriate rights holders to ask for permission to digitize them….The proposed settlement agreement would give Google a monopoly on the largest digital library of books in the world….Google will also be the only service lawfully able to sell orphan books and monetize them through subscriptions….Virtually the only way that Amazon.com, Microsoft, Yahoo!, or the Open Content Alliance could get a comparably broad license as the settlement would give Google would be by starting its own project to scan books. The scanner might then be sued for copyright infringement, as Google was. It would be very costly and very risky to litigate a fair use claim to final judgment given how high copyright damages can be (up to $150,000 per infringed work). Chances are also slim that the plaintiffs in such a lawsuit would be willing or able to settle on equivalent or even similar terms.

Samuelson concludes that the Book Search agreement as written is essentially a major restructuring of the book industry and an anticompetitive one at that. If that is indeed the case–and Google maintains that it is not–it’s worrisome indeed. Certainly, it’s reason enough for the DOJ to give the agreement a good once-over.

With potentially millions of dollars in compensatory damages at stake here, there’s no way Microsoft (MSFT) will allow the motion to go unchallenged.

The trial is currently set to begin April 13, unless the plaintiffs succeed in having it postponed.